The "Bukele Model" Part III
El Salvador's Security Policy: A Regional Temptation

El Salvador has reduced its homicide rate significantly despite being one of the worst-affected countries in the region. According to official data, the rate fell from 106 homicides per 100,000 population in 2018 to 7.8 in 2022^[1].  Despite uncertainty about the figures due to the secrecy and opacity of the Salvadoran government^[2], this remarkable accomplishment in the realm of security projects an enviable international image in a region that accounts for 33% of all homicides globally^[3], while comprising only about 8.29% of the world's population^[4].

In light of the aforementioned success, let’s take a closer look at the specific elements of the public policy that led to it.  

One of these components is the heightened presence of police and armed forces, along with a comprehensive coverage of their actions on social media. Since March 2020, the police and military have been deployed under the state of emergency declared by President Nayib Bukele. This decree grants the government broad powers, including the ability to detain individuals without a warrant or flagrant crime, hold mass trials, allocate public funds as they see fit, and control public information.

Ecuador is one of the countries most interested in adopting the security model implemented by El Salvador.  Unfortunately, the homicide rate in Ecuador has increased significantly over the past five years, rising from 6 per 100,000 population in 2018 to 40 in 2023. Recently elected President Daniel Noboa ultimately declared a state of emergency due to internal armed conflict.

Although the previous president had declared a state of emergency on eight occasions between 2021 and 2023, the new decree differed in that it was declared due to an internal armed conflict. However, while it had legal implications, it was primarily a media strategy.

Since the declaration, President Noboa has been following a script that strikingly resembles that of President Bukele. He is using the police and armed forces to patrol and detain suspects, and he is also using social media to share the apparent achievements of his security policy, which he calls “Plan Fénix.” The president's strategy has been successful, and it is highly likely that he will remain in office in 2025^[5].

There are some significant differences between the violence contexts faced by El Salvador and Ecuador in terms of public policy. While controlling criminal gangs is a challenging task in El Salvador, it is not the same as dealing with drug trafficking groups that struggle for territory and markets with international connections. The logistical complexity of controlling a territory 13 times larger than El Salvador's, with almost half covered by jungle, sets Ecuador's case apart. These differences are essential to note.

Despite these variations, it is intriguing why El Salvador's security policy is so attractive to Latin American governments, including the president of Ecuador.

One possibility, regardless of the public policy outcomes, is that this strategy is effective in portraying the president as someone who is “in charge” while labeling adversaries as enemies of the homeland and even potential crime allies.

Governments that lack substantial management capacity in terms of public policy, such as Daniel Noboa's administration due to his limited tenure in office and the economic and energy crisis, may find Bukele's recipe promising when approaching electoral processes. Nevertheless, the long-term financial implications of maintaining this approach could have a detrimental effect on the quality of democracy, potentially leading to its downfall.

Pablo Medina; Pablo Medina

Author

Pablo Medina-Pérez (Ecuador)

Political Science Program Coordinator and Professor, Universidad San Francisco de Quito. Specialist in institutional design, executive-legislative relations, elections and security policies.