Political Analysis
Privatising Democracy: The Potential Danger of a Market-Driven Public Sphere
CR: iSTock/bluecinema
Media is indispensable to democracy, providing citizens with the information and spaces needed to hold power to account. However, when media systems become dominated by private and digital actors, the public sphere itself risks being commodified. Deliberation becomes fragmented, polarization profitable, and democratic life increasingly subordinated to market incentives. While the United States illustrates these risks, Europe still has an opportunity to preserve democratic oversight of its information infrastructure. It should be emphasized, however, that the author’s critique does not concern markets as such — markets play a vital role in fostering innovation and efficiency. Rather, the real danger lies in a purely commercialized media landscape, where the pursuit of profit eclipses civic purpose and pluralism.
The Paradox of Privatisation: From Public Good to Private Sphere
Contemporary democratic governments increasingly resort to media as channels of communication but also as constitutive institutions that frame the relationship between citizens and politics and facilitate interaction among citizens. Beyond simply conveying information, media institutions influence the ways we understand politics, evaluate competing claims, and hold authorities accountable. Newspapers, broadcasters, and digital platforms provide the shared spaces in which political arguments are made and collectively deliberated. In this sense, media are not only a tool of democracy but a foundational infrastructure.
However, exactly because media are so pivotal, conditions for its operation shape the quality and health of democratic life. When ownership and control are in "private hands," the public sphere can be undermined through commodification. Commercial logics put attention, sensationalism, and polarisation ahead of deliberation, incrementally and systematically changing political debate.
Here, the paradox arises: institutions that are indispensable to democracy can, when privatised, undermine the very democratic practices they are meant to sustain.
The U.S. as a Case Study in Media-Driven Polarization?
The U.S. media system has not always been as fractured as it is today. For much of the mid-20th century, most Americans shared a handful of national news sources—network television, major newspapers, and public radio—which created a baseline of common facts and a shared civic vocabulary. Local newspapers offered relatively balanced coverage, allowing citizens across regions and parties to engage in broadly similar political debates.
Cable News and the 24-Hour Cycle
This cohesion began to weaken in the 1980s with the rise of cable news and the 24-hour news cycle. Channels like CNN introduced continuous coverage, thus turning information into constant content and content into entertainment. Tools to capture audience attention became increasingly prominent, while opinion-driven programming emerged as a way to cultivate loyal viewership. By the 1990s and 2000s, consolidation of media ownership further minimised editorial diversity, while Fox News and MSNBC became crystallised as partisan identities—one explicitly conservative and the other liberal—each framing the same events through ideologically filtered lenses.
“The Democratic Party is failing to respond effectively to Republican-led attacks, allowing them to control the narrative.” — Fox News
“Republicans continue to undermine democratic norms and exaggerate threats to the country for political gain.” — MSNBC
The Digital Acceleration
The digital age accelerated this process. Platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) turned users into curators of their own “information diets.” Algorithms now favor content that drives engagement, often outrage, fear, or affirmation of preexisting beliefs, while stories promoting compromise, nuance, or cross-partisan dialogue struggle to gain traction. These dynamics are described as “echo chambers,” where users are increasingly exposed to like-minded voices. Additional scholarship shows that today's social media consumption correlates with more hardened partisan views. Conservative audiences encounter a constant stream of content highlighting immigration crises, crime, or alleged threats to liberty, whereas liberal audiences are exposed to coverage emphasizing threats to democracy, systemic inequality, or climate urgency. Even Supreme Court decisions, protests, or electoral developments are interpreted in radically divergent ways.
Echo Chambers and Political Incentives
Echo chambers have profound political effects. Politicians quickly learnt that provocation and cultural signaling yield visibility, donations, and media coverage, while moderation and cross-party negotiation receive little or no attention. This leads to politics shifting from a contest of ideas to a battleground of identity. Party loyalty and ideological performance matter more than policy debate or compromise. Over time, the cumulative effect is a fragmented public sphere in which each side inhabits a separate reality, leaving shared truths increasingly scarce.
The American case clearly demonstrates how privatized media systems, driven by profit rather than civic purpose, can reshape political incentives and erode democratic cohesion. Outrage and division are not accidental byproducts; they are a business model. For Europe, the lesson is clear: as digital platforms and media consolidation advance, the public sphere itself risks being overturned by commercial logics, undermining the conditions necessary for deliberation, compromise, and democratic resilience.
The Trump Presidency and the “Free Speech Absolutism” Paradox
If cable news and social media fragmented the American public sphere, the Trump presidency showed how a political leader could exploit this privatized environment to reshape democratic discourse itself. Donald Trump marketed himself as a "free speech absolutist," yet his communications approach thrived on the very same drivers that disfigure democratic deliberation: outrage, polarization, and distrust. His widespread employment of X, mass demonstrations, and demonisation of his opponents guaranteed saturation reporting. In the 2016 campaign alone, he received an estimated $2 billion worth of free press. Indignation here became a political strategy and a valuable news product.
Trump's presence transcended partisan media. Even mainstream and public broadcasters, required to cover a sitting president and his constant round of announcements, preferred to promote his versions. Studies show that his control of the news cycle programmatically pushed other narratives and stories to the periphery. This near-total visibility allowed him not only to dominate the news cycles but also to create the agenda of debate, turning politics into a referendum on his persona and increasing polarisation further. His "absolutism," however, was highly selective. While he inveighed against the "fake news media" and threatened to denude Section 230 protections, he was also attempting to silence critics and delegitimise independent reporting. Appeals to free expression in response operated less as a defense of open deliberation and more as a partisan strategy, undermining trust in institutions essential to democratic accountability.
The culmination of these dynamics became most visible on January 6, 2021. Trump’s messaging on social media and his constant amplification by private media platforms had created a highly polarized and emotionally charged public sphere, rapidly mobilising supporters. The events of that day highlighted the extreme consequences of a privatized public sphere: platforms that amplified his voice enabled political action with real-world threats to democratic institutions.
The subsequent deplatforming of Trump highlighted the paradox of privatisation yet again: corporate actors, not democratic institutions, were setting the boundaries of political speech. In practice, Trump's absolutism consolidated spectacle and polarization over deliberation, undermining democratic discussion.
This raises the question: if democratic debate principles are developed by market incentives and regulated by private spaces, can the public sphere continue to serve as the foundation of a lasting democracy?
Lessons for Europe
Europe is not immune to the dynamics witnessed in the United States. While European media systems historically had stronger public-service traditions, digital platforms and media concentration are creating similar pressures. Local newspapers are decreasing across many countries, from regional papers in Germany to smaller outlets in Italy and France.
Meanwhile, Facebook, X, and YouTube control online flows of information, where citizens see what algorithmic curation decides. Left unregulated, this development threatens to fractionalize public discourse and drain democratic solidarity.
Strengthening Public-Service Media
To counter these trends, Europe can draw several lessons from the U.S. experience. First, public-service media must be invested in as core democratic infrastructure rather than discretionary programming. Broadcasters like the BBC in the U.K., ARD and ZDF in Germany, or France Télévisions provide shared information and civic foundations, counteracting the siloing effects of algorithmically driven feeds. Long-term investment, editorial independence, and digital presence are essential to keep these institutions competitive and relevant.
According to a report by the European Broadcasting Union, public service media (PSM) reach, on average, 81% of citizens weekly. This points to the significant contribution of PSM toward an informed public.
Regulating Digital Platforms
Second, platform regulation should be enforced. The EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) offer tools to increase algorithmic transparency, enforce interoperability, and allow meaningful access to platform data for researchers. For example, regulators can force platforms to disclose how political content is being recommended and create mechanisms to give priority to cross-partisan visibility, reducing echo chamber creation.
Promoting Cross-Cutting Civic Spaces
Third, fostering cross-cutting civic spaces is essential. Just as the U.S. saw the decline of unions, non-partisan associations, and local civic forums, Europe must protect institutions where citizens with diverse views interact. Schools, sports clubs, and digital forums designed for civic engagement, such as the EU-backed European Youth Portal or participatory budgeting platforms in cities like Madrid and Milan, can help cultivate shared experiences that counter ideological isolation.
Protecting Democratic Infrastructure
Finally, Europe should guard against privatisation of core democratic infrastructures. Voting technology, campaign communication platforms, and civic services should remain under accountable public oversight. In contrast to the U.S., where elections and public discourse are increasingly intermediated by private platforms, Europe can preserve citizen trust by ensuring basic systems are transparent, interoperable, and publicly accountable.
Taken together, these measures underscore a central lesson: democracy depends on a public sphere that is pluralistic, accessible, and accountable. Protecting media diversity, regulating digital platforms, and strengthening cross-cutting civic spaces are not abstract ideals—they are practical strategies to prevent the privatization of democracy and ensure the European public sphere fosters deliberation rather than division.
Conclusion - Democracy at a Crossroads
The U.S. example demonstrates that when media are beholden to commercial logic above all else, polarization isn't an error; it's the business model. The splintering of the news environment, the rise of echo chambers, and the alignment of political incentives with outrage and identity have undermined democratic cohesion, making public discourse a battlefield of irreconcilable realities. Privatization goes beyond media, influencing the way essential civic processes — from voting machines to schools and public services—are managed, too often putting corporate agendas ahead of public interests.
Europe, however, can still go another way. Strong public-service media, effective digital regulation, and the preservation of cross-cutting civic spaces can anchor a pluralistic and deliberative public sphere. Investment in institutions that underpin shared experience and exposure to a range of perspectives, together with open monitoring of core democratic infrastructure, is central to preventing erosion of trust and democratic norms.
It has become clear that the paradox here is that democracy in the contemporary era cannot function without media, yet media left to commercial forces can challenge the very foundations it sustains. By regulating the public sphere as democratic infrastructure rather than commodity, European policymakers can protect deliberation, strengthen social cohesion, and ensure that democracy is resilient in the digital age. Failing to do so could risk reproducing the polarized and fragmented system across the Atlantic, where democracy itself is privatized.
Source Directory
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CR: Jolina Öhrke
About the Author
Jolina Marie Öhrke is currently working at the German Bundestag in Berlin. She has a strong international background, shaped by formative years in Portugal, France, Hongkong, the US and Germany, which positions her in a multilingual and multicultural perspective. Her engagement with policy and leadership communities deepened during her time in Washington, D.C., where she participated in the HSF internship program.
Jolina is currently majoring in International Relations & Politics and Business & Leadership at the University of London and London School of Economics. Her academic research spans from media polarization, linguistics, and the dynamics of power politics, with a focus on how language and communication shape political behavior on the global stage.
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