Political Analysis
Liberté, Égalité, Immobilité or The crisis of the Fifth Republic

Copyright: Nicolas TAVERNIER/REA

Lecornu: “Little would be enough to make it work”

With these words, Sébastien Lecornu stepped down as prime minister on October 5, after hardly one month in office and tough negotiations about a new government and a sustainable budget for the next years. In doing so, he refrained from (ab-)using article 49,3 of the French constitution which would have allowed him to adopt a new law without the parliament’s approval.[i] Lecornu also pre-empted any attempt by the opposition to vote him out of office. Still, one could reject Lecornu’s speech as the usual propaganda of a politician who tries to defend his legacy by attributing his failure to factors beyond his control. Yet, in Lecornu’s case, his frustration about the parties’ incapacity to put aside their ideological “appetites” and make “red and orange lines” eventually become “green” was genuine and more than understandable. His criticism was mainly directed against Bruno Retailleau of Les Républicains who, only hours after joining the prime minister’s new government, had decided to leave it. The latter was outraged by the fact that Lecornu had dared to bring Bruno Le Maire, France’s former long-time (2017-2024) Minister of the Economy, Finance, Industrial and Digital Sovereignty back into the cabinet and appoint him Defense Minister. For him, as for many other French, Le Maire is one of the key political figures associated with the public debt disaster under Macron’s presidency. These accusations are unjust given the bouquet of hard-to-solve problems that Macron and Le Maire inherited from former administrations and the number of unprecedented challeges they had to meet within only a few years. Yet, Lecornu’s only error may have been that he underestimated how much of a red rag Le Maire was to other members of his government. Others criticised that his government looked too much of the same and did not inspire much confidence that it would actually be able to break with the approach and content of former Macronist governments. Nevertheless, Lecornu was right to denounce that, in the negotiations with the parties of the opposition and the “socle commun”,  i.e. Macron’s remaining power base in the Assemblée Nationale, many “political parties behave as if they had the absolute majority in parliament” wanting “the other parties to adopt the entirety of their programme”.[ii] As for himself, he had been ready to accept a compromise with the socialists on a tax for the wealthiest echelons of the society. The “socle commun” hence continues to melt away. The day following Lecornu’s resignation, president Macron mandated him with negotiating a way out of the crisis before entrusting him with a second turn as prime-minister on Friday, 10 October. The fact that Macron resisted the public and political pressure to dissolve the Assemblée Nationale and announce another round of elections, shows two things. 

First, Macron seems to fear another call to the ballot. Although elections would not necessarily yield a significantly different result, they would certainly not turn out more favourably for the centre parties. 

Second, the president seems to be convinced that Sébastien Lecornu is his best shot to forge a compromise that would allow a government still dominated by Renaissance to be tolerated by opposition parties. To make the unlikely happen, Lecornu’s second government reads much more technocratic. The head of Paris police, Laurent Nuñez, takes over the Interior Ministry from the republican Bruno Retailleau who left the government with his party. Jean-Pierre Farandou, president of French train service SNCF, becomes Minister of Labour and Solidarity. Monique Barbut, former president of WWF France, is new Minister of Ecological Transition. Edouard Geffray, director-general of school education, takes over the Ministry of National Education from former prime-minister Elisabeth Borne. 

At the same time, Macron and Lecornu weakened themselves by alienating Les Républicains who had so far been part of the government. However, after Retailleaus resignation from the Interior Ministry, he declared that his party no longer wanted to be part of a government under Macron’s presidency. Yet, by appointing ministers from the republican camp, Lecornu put Retailleau in difficult position eventually causing him to declare that these ministers were no longer members of his party. Meanwhile, La France Insoumise and Le Rassemblement National both immediately announced a no-confidence motion. It remains to be seen whether Lecornu will manage to strike a deal with the socialist party who offered their support in case the government dropped the reform of the pension system.  As of this writing, our neighbour's political system has reached an impasse, a moment of political uncertainty Europe can hardly afford.

Drawing by the French cartoonist Sanaga. French citizen: “You promised a dam, but in reality you built a bridge. What do you have to say in your defense?” Emmanuel Macron: “…that we are proud to be amateurs…”

COPYRIGHT: Sanaga

“Rien ne va plus” in Macronia

The Fifth Republic, the organisational legacy of former French President Charles de Gaulle, seems to have reached its natural expiry date.

Over the last years, President Emmanuel Macron, who once took office as a great reformer, had to pay dearly to maintain social peace. Under no other president of the Fifth Republic has debt risen as sharply as under him. Today, it stands at a staggering 114% of GDP, or around EUR 3.35 trillion.[iii] To tackle this pressing matter, in December 2024, Emmanuel Macron had appointed François Bayrou, an old-school politician of the pro-European centre party and long-time ally of Macron’s Renaissance party, his prime minister. Yet, even the latter’s capacities as a bridge-builder between right-wing and left-wing forces in parliament were not enough.[vi] Towards the end of irreconcilable negotiations in the Assemblée Nationale, Bayrou’s struggle for a more balanced budget became increasingly desperate. When he made his own position contingent on the adoption of his austerity plan as part of the new budget law and called for a vote of confidence, his fate was sealed. Like his immediate predecessor Michel Barnier, who had been the first French Prime Minister since 1962 to be brought down by a vote of no confidence, Bayrou lost the power gamble on 8 September.

Many parties, including the right extremist Rassemblement National and the left extremist La France Insoumise, speculate about early parliamentary elections. At the same time, many political movements that would normally support the austerity measures fear that they would be punished by the electorate in the 2027 presidential elections for any cooperation with the severely weakened incumbent President Emmanuel Macron. 

France's structural problem 

The problem in France is systemic. The Fifth Republic was once created to give a strong president large majorities in parliament and thus strengthen his position in implementing his political programme. However, the days when the Romanic majority voting system yielded clear parliamentary conditions are long passés. One of the most pressing problems, alongside the adoption of a solid budget, would therefore be a fundamental reform of the electoral system. It should aim at fostering the political parties’ internal cohesion by strengthening their position – on the one hand vis-à-vis the President and on the other vis-à-vis the individual members of parliament.  Such a step is as necessary as it is feared, given the negative experiences of the Fourth Republic, and has therefore been little discussed so far. However, the social and political challenges will not disappear by holding ever new snap elections.

Under the current system, no president – not even one from the far right or left – will be able to rely on stable support in parliament in the foreseeable future. The Fifth Republic is not designed for coalitions like in Germany. Constant party splits – as we witness them now among Les Républicains – and the personal ambitions of individual MPs weaken the function of parties as institutions for shaping opinion and finding compromise. Especially in times of unclear political majorities, the culture of insisting on one's own position allows at best the toleration of a minority government, but all too often leads to escalation.[x] While in the rare case of cohabitations, i.e. a constellation where president and prime minister belong to opposed political groups, new presidential or parliamentary elections provide clarity, current forecasts suggest that parliamentary elections are unlikely to result in any significant shifts in the majority situation as compared to the 2024 ballot. And even if new elections yielded a new government majority, a cohabitation is not very likely to provide the divided country with more stability, let alone social acceptance. In fact, former Prime Minister and Republican presidential candidate François Fillon once wrote in 2000 that “the Fifth Republic died in 1986 when cohabitation was accepted for the first time”, thereby curtailing presidential power.^[xi] For this reason, President Macron was right to refrain from dissolving the Assemblée Nationale and holding new elections in September 2025. He was also right to appoint his loyal companion Sébastien Lecornu  to succeed Bayrou at the Hôtel de Matignon – and to entrust him even with a second mandate after his first attempt failed.

François Bayrou (left) and Sébastien Lecornu (right) at the handover ceremony on 10 September

COPYRIGHT: Gouvernement Français 2025

The party dispute in France

Yet, even with the appointment of Sébastien Lecornu as Prime Minister, Macron's Renaissance party does not have a stable parliamentary majority. Lecornu’s fate hinges on successful talks with the parties.  

Upon taking office on 10 September, as a sign of his willingness to compromise, Lecornu already promised a “break, not only in form, not only in methods, but a break in substance”. His words were immediately followed by action. Bayrou's proposal to abolish two public holidays was quickly taken off the table. He also withdrew the lifetime official car privilege from all former prime ministers. Symbolic policies! But in times of social division, symbols matter. In addition, the taboo subject of higher taxes for the wealthiest echelons of society now seems to be at least open to discussion under Lecornu. In return, the moderate wing of the socialist party (PS) around former President François Hollande has already announced that they did not want to make a “fetish” out of the so-called “Taxe Zucman” an inheritance tax for the super-rich with a heritable fortune of over 100 million euros.[xii] However, most PS leaders are making the implementation of “Taxe Zucman” a key condition for deeper cooperation in the budget negotiations. They base their demands on a survey by the IFOP Institute, according to which around 86% of French people would welcome such a tax,[xiii] which is estimated to bring in between 5 and 20 billion euros for the treasury.[ix]

Also colleagues of the Republicans showed interest in deepening collaboration, should Lecornu be willing to reduce public spending, and compromise on issues like migration and economy[x] The Republicans vehemently reject the “Taxe Zucman”, citing its impact on economic competitiveness.[xi]

Even though the far-right Rassemblement National immediately refused to support the budget negotiations, Lecornu himself is likely to enjoy at least some sympathy among them. Long before his appointment as Prime Minister, Lecornu, in his capacity as Minister of the Armed Forces, held secret talks with the Rassemblement National, thereby gaining a certain amount of leeway in supporting Ukraine. Despite the scandalisation of this meeting by Libération and Le Monde,[xii] this calm pragmatism free of ideology could have provided Lecornu with greater room for manoeuvre than his predecessors. 

However, his chances to broker a deal on significant reforms remained relatively slim as his short-lived first mandate as prime-minister impressively shows.

Egalité under pressure

This is also due to the social mood in the country. In view of the political class's inability to solve the country's problems and present a sustainable budget, 74% of the French population said they had little or no confidence in politics (compared to 53% in Germany). The government, parliament and president obtained particularly poor approval ratings of only 23%, 24% and 26% respectively. 71% of people believed that democracy in France was no longer functioning properly. Political parties in particular were trusted by only 16% of respondents.[xiii]

Yet, it would be too easy to blame Macron alone. He is often accused of being arrogant, elitist, and too business-friendly, with policies that ignore the needs of ordinary people. But Macron's presidency has also been marked by crises of a frequency and intensity rarely seen before. His first years as president were dominated by the refugee crisis and the social movement of the “Gilets Jaunes”. This was followed by the COVID-19 crisis and the recession associated with it. Russia's invasion of Ukraine presented the next test. These external crises were exacerbated by numerous incidents of social unrest. The explanation for this is not immediately apparent. At first glance, the figures from the national statistics institute INSEE suggest a rather positive picture. Unemployment has fallen from around 10.5% in 2015 to around 7.5% in 2025.[xiv] Also the purchasing power of French households is said to have increased by 3.4% between 2019 and 2025.[xv] The French economy is not doing too badly overall. With a plus of 0.3% as compared to the same period last year, growth is even slightly above the EU average.[xvi]  

At the same time, however, social mobility is poor in the country of “égalité”. The country's political and economic leadership is mainly recruited from graduates of the Grandes Écoles. Only the small, mostly socially privileged intellectual elite of the country make it into these special universities. Aware of the problem, President Macron closed the most prestigeous of them, the famous École Nationale de l'Administration (ENA), of which he himself is one of the most prominent alumni. In 2022, it was replaced by the allegedly more inclusive Institut National du Service Public (INSP). Nevertheless, in 2023, the number of people affected by poverty and inequality reached its highest level since measurements began in 1996. 9.8 million people, or 15.4% of the total population, lived on an average of only 1,288 EUR per month, with the unemployed, single parents and children being the most severely affected. The social divide is widening. While the average standard of living rose faster than inflation, it fell for the poorest 10% of the country.[xvii] Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that Bayrou's austerity measures, including the abolishment of two public holidays, drove the masses onto the streets, outraged by what they perceived to be an attack on the few remaining joys of ordinary people.

The failure of a society

The “Bloquons tout”-campaign (“Let's block everything”) is only the most recent example of the changed mobilisation behaviour of the French. Revolution has always been part of France’s cultural DNA. But whereas in the past, powerful trade unions were the main drivers of nationwide protests, people now seem to be increasingly taking to the streets independently of them, spontaneously mobilised by ephemeral social media initiatives. Composed of normal demonstrators, violent anti-capitalist rioters and frustrated individuals from the banlieues, these movements become elusive. Due to their distance from traditional corporate actors such as trade unions, they are virtually beyond the reach of politics. 

At the same time, however, trade unions continue to play an important role. A few days after “Bloquons tout” and just one day after a trade union-organised strike involving over 500,000 demonstrators, the major trade unions issued Lecornu with an ultimatum. In particular, they called on Lecornu to abandon Bayrou's unpopular plan for an année blanche, i.e. the freezing of public spending at 2025 level, as well as to refrain from cutting 3,000 civil service jobs and reject the planned reform of France’s unemployment insurance. If the government did not present acceptable proposals before 24 September, the unions would call for another strike within days.[xviii]

In the past, such pressure from the streets has often prompted the government to engage in rapid, consumptive spending that has done little or nothing to address the country's structural problems. This is not least due to the expectations of many French people. There has always been a widespread belief that the state should take responsibility for all social problems.

The “Gilets Jaunes”-movement (2018-2019) alone cost France billions of euros. In the third quarter of 2018, French GDP shrank by 0.1%, while consumption slumped by 0.6% in the same period. Shopping centres, for example, had to cope with losses of EUR 2 billion as a result of the massive protests and riots. The catering and tourism industries lost around EUR 850 million. The transport sector lost between EUR 600-800 million. Tax revenues fell accordingly.[xix]   In addition, almost EUR 17 billion were spent on support programmes and cash gifts to appease the partly violent protests.[xx]

Such gifts also reward particularly radical forms of protest. The French state is permanently held hostage by social movements. Peaceful demonstrations for a legitimate socio-political goal all too often degenerate into an angry and partly violent reckoning with the political class. Vandalism and blockades of the entire country cost the state billions and nip necessary reforms in the bud. 

Who is the ‘warrior monk’ Sébastien Lecornu?

The old and new French prime minister Sébastien Lecornu has to prove himself in this complex situation. For this, he appears well equipped.

Before switching to Macron's camp, he served as mayor (2014 and 2015) of the small town of Vernon in Normandy for the UMP (now the Republicans) before becoming president of the Eure departmental council (2015-2017 and 2021-2022).[xxi] From this time in the French periphery, Lecornu knows the needs and concerns of the rural population, understands their feeling of being left behind, suffering from poor infrastructure and scarce opportunities. During his first domestic trip after taking office, he thus promised to build 5,000 health centres in rural areas by 2027.[xxii]

Already back in 2019, during the “Gilets jaunes”-movement, the modest and serious politician earned a reputation for not being afraid to engage with ordinary people. Under his leadership, open public forums were set up, providing disappointed citizens with a platform to voice their concerns – beyond blockades and protests.[xxiii] He is considered the warrior monk (‘moine-soldat’) among French politicians. Coming from a modest background, he once tried to join a Benedictine monastery as a young man before studying law at Paris-2 Panthéon-Assas (and not at one of the elite universities).[xxiv] As former Minister of the Armed Forces (May 2022-September 2025), he also stands for the defence of France's sovereignty – a value that is dear to the patriotic French soul. At the same time, his appointment to the second highest office in the state can also be seen as an important signal to France's European partners. Macron is giving preference to one of his loyal supporters who, like himself, stands for the European cause, cares deeply about supporting Ukraine and is committed to continuity in foreign policy issues.

COPYRIGHT: Bundesregierung/Steffen Kugler" German-French Minister Council in Toulon, 29. August 2025: A way forward?

The European dimension

This view is also shared in Russia.[xxv] National media loyal to the Kremlin explain the failure of the Bayrou government by France’s “geopolitical ambitions”. According to Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Paris preferred to throw public money at Kiev rather than devote it to the needs of its own population. However, Russia is also concerned that under Lecornu, little change can be expected in France's “anti-Russian” policy.[xxvi] In Ukraine, on the other hand, the media landscape is rather unsure about this. Oleg Shamshur, former Ukrainian ambassador to France, expressed concern that the government crisis and domestic budget problems could weaken Macron as a leader in “mobilising European support for Kiev”.[xxvii] 

As if to prove this, on 3rd October, French navy detained a tanker flagged in Benin, yet belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet which transported oil from Russia to India. The Chinese captain and his crew were presumed to be involved in the drone incidents around Danish airports. Following the French authorities’ intervention, Russia’s dictator Wladimir Putin accused Macron of distracting French public from domestic problems and emulating Napoleon Bonaparte by provoking Russia.[xxviii]

It is therefore hardly surprising that the Kremlin reacted scornfully on Lecornu’s resignation. Former Russian president Dimitri Medwedw, for instance, taunted on X that even Russia’s Cossack horses that had entered Paris in 1814 would have done a better job than the ephemeric French prime-minister. [xxix]

The complicated political constellation in France thus seems to have direct consequences for the security architecture in Europe. Germany in particular must prepare to assume even more responsibility for the EU's external security in the future, not least in order to give Macron the time and financial leeway he needs until 2027 to get his domestic political problems under control and arrange his succession in the interests of Europe.

Renaissance of the Renaissance Party?

In this endeavour, however, President Macron is often said to follow a “Merkel logic” à la française.[xxx] Many accuse the former German chancellor and CDU leader of being responsible for her party’s leadership crisis. Out of fear of (potential) rivals in her own party, she offered little opportunity for new personnel to make their mark.

After Gabriel Attal, Sébastien Lecornu is now the second promising Renaissance cadre that the French president has appointed to the top of his government within a short period of time. Giving Lecornu little leeway to negotiate beyond the president’s political red lines, Macron cornered his prime minister just as much as the other parties in the Assemblée Nationale. It is therefore hardly surprising that on Monday, 6 October, Lecornu abandoned the cause, completely frustrated by the stalemate between the parties. 

With the position of prime minister under his leadership currently being an ejection seat rather than an elevator, Macron might, by now, have used up two promising contenders for presidential office possibly annihilating all chances to pretend to a presidency of their own. Although Macron’s long-time ally and current Justice Minister, Gérald Darmanin, is said to have presidential ambitions, it is still completely unclear who will succeed him as the Renaissance party’s presidential candidate in 2027. 

This makes it all the more understandable that Gabriel Attal, nowadays Renaissance Secretary-General and leader of the party’s parliamentary group, is increasingly distancing himself from his former mentor. At the party’s congress in Arras, he criticised Macron’s dissolution of the Assemblée Nationale last year as “irresponsible” and called it the main cause of the current political instability. According to him, the party must “reinvent itself” and emancipate itself from the “myth” of a single saviour at the helm. Power must be shared.[xxxi] When his party colleague Lecornu stepped down from the prime minister’s office, Attal even declared that he “could no longer understand the decisions of the president” and criticised Macron’s stubborn eagerness to cling to power. He proposed a new approach using an impartial negotiator to solve the dire political solution.[xxxii] Some accuse Attal of publicly sabotaging Macron and dividing the party. But does he have any other choice? Renaissance must become more independent from the incumbent president if it wants to still play a role in the future. The party needs new prominent faces who are more than puppets of the unpopular president. It also needs a new culture of open debate in which ideas that are not approved by its founder also have a chance to prevail. Lecornu and Attal may become the fathers of a renaissance of the Renaissance party. 

Foreign policy as new domestic policy

It will be interesting to see how Attal and Lecornu deal with issues that are viewed very negatively by large parts of the French public. For instance, Lecornu can hardly afford to ignore the demands of the rural communities which reject the EU Commission's free trade agreement with the Mercosur countries. This deal is a red rag to the vocal farming industry who fear for their livelihoods if the products of South America's large-scale ranches, which produce at significantly lower costs and with fewer restrictions, were allowed to flood the European market.[xxxiii]  

It is hence clear that the political paralysis at home condemns the French state leaders to seek resort in its last remaining prerogative, the foreign affairs domain. This becomes even more obvious against the backdrop of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza caused by Israel in its war against the terrorist organisation Hamas. Criticism of Israel in France has increased massively over the last months pressuring Macron to act more resolutely against Netanyahu’s extremist government. On 22 September, Macron hence announced France's recognition of the Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in New York.[xxxiv] In the eyes of the large left-wing and Muslim communities in France, Macron's move is likely to appear consistent and long overdue. Yet, the French government urgently needs more such success stories. It must appear strong and determined if it is to survive beyond the next budget vote.

But without Germany, Macron and Lecornu will not be able to make any headway on budget issues, Mercosur or sanctions against Israel. On these and other issues of European significance, the position of the German government might be decisive. If not for the sake of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, Friedrich Merz’ government should abandon its rigid position on the Israel issue as a signal to France. Only if the French government can deliver with Germany's help can Friedrich Merz hope for a pro-European government in Paris after the end of the Macron era. Only then will the Franco-German tandem continue to have a chance of acting as the engine of Europe.

The country needs more fraternité

Given its dire social and political situation, one would like to recommend French society to learn, for once, from its former colonies – pardon, protectorates. After the so-called Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2011, a democratic transition only became possible because four influential civil society interest groups, consisting of the largest trade union UGTT, the Bar Association, the Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, and the Tunisian League for Human Rights, joined forces to form the so-called Quartet du Dialogue National. At an economic low point and in a state of political uncertainty, threatened by Islamist terrorism, they refrained from paralysing the country with large-scale strikes. Instead, they decided to give the political parties a chance to tackle the country's reform problems. For this unlikely feat of social unity, the Quartet was rightly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.[xxxv]

Of course, France is in a much better position than Tunisia was in 2011. It has functioning institutions, relatively low levels of corruption, a strong civil society, an economy that is still relatively stable and clear civic values that can provide moral orientation. The only thing missing to regain its former creativity and productivity is the people’s readiness to accept compromise, which would give politicians room for manoeuvre even in times of unclear majority conditions. More than ever, France needs its famous fraternité, a broad alliance of social and political actors, to overcome the country's immobilité, its inability to reform. Alors enfants de la patrie! Marchez!

About the Author

Dr. Andreas Wüst is consultant for EU projects at the Brussels office of Hanns Seidel Foundation. Before joining the foundation’s team in the European capital, he completed his political science PhD at the University of Bayreuth, Germany, and worked as parliamentary assistant in the German Bundestag. Before his classics degree at LMU Munich in 2017, he also studied at Université Paris IV, Sorbonne, and temporarily worked as a free-lance blogger for the French editor Les Belles Lettres.

Sources

[i] This law would only pass provided that the Assemblée Nationale does not manage to vote a motion of no-confidence within 24 hours after the prime-minister’s move. 

[ii]  Gouvernement Français: Démission de Sébastien Lecornu. In: Gouvernement Français, 06.10.2025: www.info.gouv.fr/actualite/demission-de-sebastien-lecornu [13.10.2025].

[iii] By comparison, Germany has debts of €2.7 trillion, which equals only 62% of its GDP. Cf. République française - Vie Publique: La dette française en 2025 : les principaux chiffres. In: vie-publique.fr, 17.07.2025: www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/299569-la-dette-francaise-en-2025-les-principaux-chiffres [25.09.2025].

[iv] Hennequin, Julien: France: François Bayrou, un ténor centriste à Matignon. In: RFI, 13.12.2024: www.rfi.fr/fr/france/20241213-france-fran%C3%A7ois-bayrou-un-t%C3%A9nor-centriste-%C3%A0-matignon [25.09.2025]. 

[v] For more details, see Hans J. Tümmers: Das politische System Frankreichs – eine Einführung, C.H.Beck, Munich 2006.

[vi] Fillon, François and Jeudy, Bruno: « Oui à un régime présidentiel » François Fillon(RPR). In: Le Parisien, 15.05.2000: www.leparisien.fr/politique/oui-a-un-regime-presidentiel-francois-fillon-rpr-15-05-2000-2001375349.php [13.10.2025].. 

[vii] Alemagna, Lilian: Taxe Zucman : François Hollande ne veut pas en faire «un fétiche». In: Libération, 14.09.2025: www.liberation.fr/politique/taxe-zucman-francois-hollande-ne-veut-pas-en-faire-un-fetiche-20250914_PPVF7I6MZ5CCBIKIXMYT3FGGJ4/ [26.09.2025]. 

[viii] IFOP: Le soutien des Français à différentes mesures portées par la gauche, 19.09.2025: www.ifop.com/article/le-soutien-des-francais-a-differentes-mesures-portees-par-la-gauche/ [25.09.2025].

[ix] Brunet, Romain: Des retraites à la taxe Zucman : quelles seront les "ruptures" évoquées par Sébastien Lecornu ? In: FRANCE 24, 11.09.2025: www.france24.com/fr/france/20250911-retraites-taxe-zucman-quelles-seront-les-ruptures-%C3%A9voqu%C3%A9es-par-s%C3%A9bastien-lecornu-premier-ministre-parti-socialiste [26.09.2025]. 

[x] France Info and France 2: Gouvernement de Sébastien Lecornu : "Les Républicains doivent sauter du Titanic macroniste et rejoindre l'union avec le RN", estime Éric Ciotti, président de l'UDR. In: Franceinfo, 17.09.2025: www.franceinfo.fr/politique/gouvernement-de-sebastien-lecornu/gouvernement-de-sebastien-lecornu-les-republicains-doivent-sauter-du-titanic-macroniste-et-rejoindre-l-union-avec-le-rn-estime-eric-ciotti-president-de-l-udr_7497172.html [25.09.2025]. 

[xi] La rédaction avec AFP: Politique. Les Républicains posent « deux limites » à leur participation au gouvernement Lecornu. In: Le Dauphiné Libéré, 14.09.2025: www.ledauphine.com/politique/2025/09/14/les-republicains-posent-deux-limites-a-leur-participation-au-gouvernement-lecornu [25.09.2025]. 

[xii] Royer, Solenn de and Vincent, Elise: « L’énigme » Sébastien Lecornu, seul ministre rescapé des deux mandats d’Emmanuel Macron, désormais à la tête du gouvernement. In: Le Monde, 09.09.2025: www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/09/09/l-enigme-sebastien-lecornu-seul-ministre-rescape-des-deux-mandats-d-emmanuel-macron-desormais-a-la-tete-du-gouvernement_6350633_823449.html [25.09.2025]. 

[xiii] In Germany, by comparison, only 25% feel mistrust, 15% feel weariness and 16% feel disenchantment.

SciencesPo (CEVIPOF) and opinionway: En qu[o]i les Français ont-ils confiance aujourd'hui ?: www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/Barometre%20confiance%20CEVIPOF%20Vague%2016%20fev%202025-v2_0.pdf

[xiv] Insee: Tableau de bord de l'économie française, 26.09.2025: www.insee.fr/fr/outil-interactif/5367857/tableau/50_MTS/52_CHO [26.09.2025].

[xv] Banque de France: La mesure du pouvoir d’achat | Banque de France, 17.03.2025: www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications-et-statistiques/publications/la-mesure-du-pouvoir-lachat [26.09.2025]. 

[xvi] Eurostat: Gross domestic product (GDP) and main components (output, expenditure and income), 26.09.2025: ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NAMQ_10_GDP__custom_7680558/bookmark/table [26.09.2025]. 

[xvii] Rieg, Christelle and Rousset, Arnaud: Niveau de vie et pauvreté en 2023, 26.09.2025: www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8600989 [26.09.2025]. 

[xviii] France 24 and AFP: L'intersyndicale donne jusqu'à mercredi à Lecornu pour répondre "à leurs revendications". In: FRANCE 24, 19.09.2025: www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20250919-l-intersyndicale-donne-jusqu-%C3%A0-mercredi-%C3%A0-lecornu-pour-r%C3%A9pondre-%C3%A0-leurs-revendications-1 [26.09.2025]. 

[xix] Cazeneuve, Jean-René and Lescure, Roland: Rapport d'information déposé en application de l'article 145 du règlement en conclusion des travaux de la mission d'information commune sur les coûts économiques, sociaux et budgétaires des blocages, violences et dégradations commis en marge du mouvement des "gilets jaunes": www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/micgjaunes/l15b2167_rapport-information [26.09.2025]. 

[xx] Alemagna, Lilian: Gilets jaunes : les 17 milliards à la loupe. In: Libération, 16.11.2019: www.liberation.fr/france/2019/11/16/gilets-jaunes-les-17-milliards-a-la-loupe_1763559/ [26.09.2025]. and Mazuir, Valérie: « Gilets jaunes » : les mesures en faveur du pouvoir d'achat. In: Les Echos, 11.02.2019: www.lesechos.fr/economie-france/budget-fiscalite/carburants-fioul-voitures-polluantes-les-aides-annoncees-par-le-gouvernement-147446 [25.09.2025]. 

[xxi] Mazuir, Valérie: Sébastien Lecornu, Premier ministre : ce qu'il faut savoir. In: Les Echos, 10.09.2025: www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/gouvernement/sebastien-lecornu-premier-ministre-ce-quil-faut-savoir-2185506 [25.09.2025]. 

[xxii] Gouvernement Français: 5 000 maisons « France santé » d’ici à 2027, 15.09.2025: www.info.gouv.fr/actualite/5-000-maisons-france-sante-d-ici-2027 [25.09.2025]. 

[xxiii] T.A.: Fidèle parmi les fidèles de Macron, discret… Qui est Sébastien Lecornu, le nouveau Premier ministre ? In: TF1 Info, 09.09.2025: www.tf1info.fr/politique/venu-de-la-droite-fidele-d-emmanuel-macron-qui-est-sebastien-lecornu-nomme-nouveau-premier-ministre-2393652.html [25.09.2025].

[xxiv] Royer, Solenn de and Vincent, Elise: « L’énigme » Sébastien Lecornu, seul ministre rescapé des deux mandats d’Emmanuel Macron, désormais à la tête du gouvernement. In: Le Monde, 09.09.2025: www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/09/09/l-enigme-sebastien-lecornu-seul-ministre-rescape-des-deux-mandats-d-emmanuel-macron-desormais-a-la-tete-du-gouvernement_6350633_823449.html [25.09.2025].

[xxv] Many thanks to Mariana Dets for analysing the Russian and Ukrainian media reports quoted in this section.

[xxvi] РИА Новости: Захарова высказалась о смене премьер-министра во Франции. In: РИА Новости, 12.09.2025: ria.ru/20250912/moskva-2041450896.html [26.09.2025].; РИА Новости: Захарова прокомментировала кризис политики во Франции. In: РИА Новости, 12.09.2025: ria.ru/20250912/zaharova-2041470969.html [25.09.2025]. ГРИШИН, Александр: Нацсобрание Франции подписало смертный приговор «коалиции желающих»: Правительство ушло в отставку из-за денежных разногласий. In: Комсомольская правда — KP.RU, 08.09.2025: www.kp.ru/daily/27748/5139987/ [25.09.2025]..

[xxvii] Шипуля, Валерія: Політична криза у Франції: що це означає для України. In: Корреспондент.net, 10.09.2025: ua.korrespondent.net/articles/4814694-politychna-kryza-u-frantsii-scho-tse-oznachaie-dlia-ukrainy [25.09.2025].

[xxviii] runews24.ru: Париж перешёл черту — и получил по заслугам. Как Кремль устроил Макрону публичную порку. Европа на пороге. In: Рамблер/новости, 08.10.2025: news.rambler.ru/articles/55427554-parizh-pereshel-chertu-i-poluchil-po-zaslugam-kak-kreml-ustroil-makronu-publichnuyu-porku-evropa-na-poroge-peremen/ [13.10.2025].

[xxix] Senecal, Audrey: "Микрона отстранят": Елисейский дворец посыпался от одной шутки Медведева (Le Journal du Dimanche, Франция). In: Inosmi, 07.10.2025: inosmi.ru/20251007/frantsiya-275040835.html [13.10.2025].

[xxx] France 24: Emmanuel Macron, Gabriel Attal, la relation dissoute. In: FRANCE 24, 20.09.2025: www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20250920-emmanuel-macron-gabriel-attal-la-relation-dissoute [25.09.2025]. 

[xxxi] Vermelin, Jérôme: "Je savais que la France en paierait le prix" : Attal tacle Macron sur la dissolution et pose des jalons pour 2027. In: TF1 Info, 21.09.2025: www.tf1info.fr/politique/discours-gabriel-attal-je-savais-que-la-france-en-paierait-le-prix-attal-tacle-macron-sur-la-dissolution-et-pose-des-jalons-pour-2027-2395927.html [25.09.2025].

[xxxii] Bro, J. and AFP: Crise politique: Gabriel Attal "ne comprend plus les décisions" d'Emmanuel Macron. In: BFMTV, 06.10.2025: www.bfmtv.com/politique/la-republique-en-marche/crise-politique-gabriel-attal-ne-comprend-plus-les-decisions-d-emmanuel-macron_AD-202510060867.html [13.10.2025].

[xxxiii] France 24: Accord UE-Mercosur: quel impact sur l'agriculture européenne ? In: FRANCE 24, 03.09.2025: www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20250903-accord-ue-mercosur-quel-impact-sur-l-agriculture-europ%C3%A9enne [25.09.2025].

[xxxiv] Élysee: 80e session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à New York : première journée, 22.09.2025: www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/09/22/80e-session-de-lassemblee-generale-des-nations-unies-a-new-york-premiere-journee [25.09.2025].

[xxxv] Nobel Peace Prize 2015: National Dialogue Quartet. In: NobelPrize.org: www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/tndq/facts/ [25.09.2025].