Security and Defence
Porcupine Eats Piggy Bank: Is Europe getting serious about its Defence Union?

NiseriN; iStock

“If you want peace, prepare for war,” goes the old Latin adage – and summarises the mood in Brussels these days. In a new Defence White Paper, “European Defence Readiness 2030,” prepared by the EU’s first-ever appointed Defence Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, and the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, the EU has laid out its long-term defence policy. 

And, indeed, the paper’s second sentence does not read plain Latin but says the same in rather Shakespearean English:

“The only way we can ensure peace is to have the readiness to deter those who would do us harm.”

The cautious phrasing is due to the fact that “We’re not doing this to go to war, but to prepare for the worst and defend peace in Europe,” as Kaja Kallas put it.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe has operated in crisis mode, and the sense of urgency has only aggravated during the first weeks of the Trump 2.0 administration. For many, US Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference marked a final turning point in the transatlantic relationship, even divorce, not least because he lectured the European Union and its member states on free speech – unveiling a drastic diverge in political culture and understanding of shared values between the old and the new continent.

Meanwhile, the American Commander-in-Chief, President Donald Trump, has caused a stir in European capitals with his recurring remarks on potentially annexing Greenland, Canada, as well as bringing the Panama Canal under Washington’s control. Not to mention his disdain for the European Union, once again unleashing a trade war. Then came the unprecedented, public spat with Ukraine’s President Zelensky in the Oval Office in February. By stopping American aid and intelligence sharing shortly afterwards, the White House endangered the lives of Ukrainian troops and sent a shockwave across the continent. 

US Vice President JD Vance shocked his European audience at the Munich Security Conference 2025.

MSC/Lennart Preiss

Russia could attack NATO in 2029 – but Pentagon turns its back on European security officials

In recent months, European security officials have noticed a chilly attitude coming from the U.S. Department of Defence, reporting difficulties scheduling meetings with their counterparts at the Pentagon – or just arranging informal coffees. 

This comes at a time when European intelligence services and governments warn that Russia could attack NATO within the next five years, with Germany’s Minister of Defence even considering 2029 the tipping point for a potential invasion.

Too many wake-up calls for Europe to take its security into its own hands had remained unheeded for too long. The message had started resonating under the first Trump presidency only, as Trump questioned America’s security commitment to Europe if the continent did not increase its defence spending. While Trump’s rhetoric came as a shock – as did his decision to withdraw troops from Germany which was later revoked by Biden –, a shift in US military strategy had already been indicated by Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” Unsurprisingly, although more cordial in tone, the Biden administration continued urging the EU to take up responsibility for its own defence. 

"We’re not doing this to go to war, but to prepare for the worst and defend peace in Europe," said Kaja Kallas at the presentation of the Commission's White Paper on European Defence.

© European Union, 2025, CC BY 4.0

Highly anticipated EU Defence White Paper calls for readiness by 2030 – but Commission needs member states to follow suit

With Trump back in office, and taking into account the long-term geopolitical shifts, the European Commission now acknowledges in its White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 that “a new international order will be formed in the second half of this decade and beyond” and that “the United States, traditionally a strong ally, is clear that it believes it is over-committed in Europe and needs to rebalance, reducing its historical role as a primary security guarantor.” 

Correspondingly, the EU finds itself in “a harsher world of hyper-competitive and transactional geopolitics” in which the Union needs to reckon with “the most extreme military contingencies.”

The crux is, however, that Brussels is not in charge of a joint European military command. The treaties empower the Commission to become active in the economic-industrial realm only; foreign and security policy, including a common security and defence policy, are laid out in strategic guidelines by the European Council – the EU’s national governments. 

In this state-owned decision-making process, the European Commission, including its Defence Commissioner and the High Representative, as well as the European Defence Agency (EDA), only support and advise EU member states on how to further improve and pool their resources in the defence industry and technological sector. 

And EU member states are unlikely to give up on their prerogative when it comes to foreign policy and defence. Indeed, an earlier draft of Defence White Paper seen by several media outlets was watered down after interventions of some EU member states. The  Commission had initially envisaged to launch “large-scale pan-European flagship projects,” such as an European Air Shield. Berlin and Paris, however, opined that it is not the task of the Commission to do defence planning.

No joint army, but a common defence industry market

Being aware of these sensitivities and intricacies, the White Paper recognises “member states will always retain responsibility for their own troops, from doctrine to deployment, and for the definition needs of their armed forces.” 

This still is a far cry from a true “Defence Union” with a joint army. 

While a European joint command isn’t in the cards for political reasons, its prospects to stand on its own feet would be highly unrealistic anyways. European states remain dependent on NATO legacy structures, with all its expertise, technological know-how – and American guidance. NATO still fries the fish; but the EU must serve the tables.

Accordingly, from its first page onwards, the Defence White Paper stresses NATO as the cornerstone of Europe’s collective security. The EU, it states, should provide “support to collaborative capability development” to “facilitate EU Member States in NATO to deliver on their capability targets more quickly and economically with enhanced interoperability.”

With the political limitations put on the European Commission, the White Paper now asks national governments to define “a set of Defence Projects of Common European Interest.”

Nevertheless, the idea is the EU to accelerate the economies of scale to close capability gaps in these areas, to future-proof European infrastructure for high-intensity warfare – firstly, through ramping up the production and stockpiling of ammunition, missiles and drones in the short term, secondly by enhancing transport infrastructure and logistics in the long run. 

Here it’s the EU’s regulatory power that shall cut red tape and harmonise national rules such as customs procedures. A new dialogue with the defence industry shall inform simplifications for certifications, construction and environmental permits, ESG investment, and exchange of sensitive information.   

Details for the rearmament of Europe still need to be hashed out, though it is already clear that the initiative rests on borrowed money only – opening doors for rising debt levels.

Peerayot; iStock

"ReArm Europe", with debts

But most importantly, the Commission tries to encourage EU member states to work together and pool their demands in joint purchasing projects. Brussels further offers to act as a central purchasing body – which would require a respective mandate given by EU member states.

Central to this endeavour is the “ReArm Europe” initiative. It shall inject EUR 800 billion into the European defence industry – and give a structural incentive for member states to place joint purchases, thus streamlining and harmonising their defence capabilities and cutting costs. A larger magnitude of purchases would also provide European defence companies with the needed long-term contracts and viable business prospects. 

Details for the financing scheme still need to be hashed out, though it is already clear that the initiative rests on borrowed money only – opening doors for rising debt levels. 

As the first pillar of its two major pillars, Brussels invites EU member states to invoke the “national escape clause” of the Stability and Growth Pact. This would allow them to expand national deficits by an additional 1.5 per cent of GDP. This is the first pillar of “ReArm Europe” and it will, according to planners in the Commission, release EUR 650 billion. 

The remaining EUR 150 billion – “ReArm Europe’s" second pillar – are solely based on debts as well. With the so-called Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, the Commission will borrow money on capital markets. Then, the Commission will provide favourable loans to the member states (which they need to pay back as well, of course). 

France and Southern Europe reject national debts, ask for Eurobonds

The relaxation of national deficit brakes imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact was welcomed with mixed feelings at the European Council meeting the day after the launch of the White Paper. 

Whilst Italy’s Meloni criticised the reliance on national debts and asked for EU guarantees and more private funding, Greece’s Mitsotakis was emboldened to suggest discussing “the possibility of a joint borrowing facility that would also offer grants to member states in order to make defence investment decisions.” Spain’s Sanchez, at the same time, asked to expand the definition of security to climate risks.

The so-called frugal states – such as Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands –, on the other hand, once again opposed Eurobonds, but nevertheless gave their green light for the Commission’s EUR 150,000 SAFE lending scheme. 

But demands for so-called defence bonds will build up in the months to come, especially from the south of Europe that do not want to increase their debt levels, including France. Since European leaders had less than 24 hours to study the White Paper and prepare their responses, it is expected that more discussions are to follow at another meeting of the European Council ahead of the NATO Summit in June. Part of these debates will be Brussels plans to set up a “European Military Sales Mechanism”.

The White Paper for European Defence calls on member states to replenish their depleted stocks of military hardware, ammunition and equipment.

A “porcupine” doctrine for Ukraine – and Europe

But questions about financing – and the willingness of EU governments to use the ticket to national debt – aside, what’s the vision of “European Defence Readiness 2030”?

First, in the short term, it is about replenishing Europe’s “depleted stocks of military hardware and equipment”, as well as making the continent’s infrastructure “dual-use” ready, to ensure military mobility and economic resilience in the longer run. 

Ukraine takes center stage in this vision. In what the Commission coins “porcupine strategy”, the EU and its members shall ramp up military assistance to Ukraine, so that the country can withstand any further onslaughts by Russia – just like a steel porcupine. Artillery ammunition, drones, missiles and a “Air Defence Initiative” are the priority defence stings. Furthermore, European troops shall learn from the frontline experience of Ukrainian soldiers, to be prepared for future battlefield practice that includes AI and quantum technologies. 

A lesson learned by Ukraine has been that NATO’s battle recipes have been insufficient for modern, high-tech warfare. The Russian forces have adapted to technological changes such as drones, so did Ukraine – and Europe needs to implement these lessons learned. And as Ukraine’s defence industry has shown to be highly innovative, the goal is not only to support Ukrainian companies, but to integrate them into the EU’s single defence market. Beyond industry, the EU suggests giving Kyiv access to the EU space assets and services with their data for communication, navigation and earth observation.     

March 19, 2025: High Representative Kaja Kallas and Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius present the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030.

© European Union, 2025, CC BY 4.0

Outlook: Change in strategic culture depends on EU member states

Without a doubt, the “European Defence Union” must not be mistaken for a full-fledged and functional collective security structure. This becomes clear with the published White Paper and its prime put on NATO. Nevertheless, the EU has outlined a plethora of tools and instruments to provide the infrastructure needed for NATO’s collective defence and credibility: build a strong single European defence market, understand infrastructure as a dual use project, incorporate lessons learned in and innovation from Ukraine, integrate Ukraine’s defence industry, and give European governments the headroom to mobilise funds for pooling military equipment and ammunition.

In the end, however, it will depend fully on EU member states if and how they make use of these instruments. 

Regional divides raise scepticism about how much the strategic culture has actually changed among all member states. 

Fittingly, the Commission is acutely aware of the lack of awareness. In a separate but connected “European Preparedness Union Strategy” released last week, the Commission calls for “a new preparedness mindset” and sets out an agenda for civil-military cooperation. 

Indeed, the Commission is paving the way to a defence industry union and does its job in shifting strategic culture. In a continental arms race, it shall turn Ukraine as much as the whole of Europe into a porcupine too hard to swallow for the Russian army.   

Yet hardware won’t defend Europe; it needs apt soldiers to carry and operate this equipment, to shoot the bullets and steer the drones. Unfortunately, personnel is another acute shortage which a European Defence Union will need to address to become ready to defend. 

And, finally, a porcupine may deter to a certain degree only. As Admiral Pierre Vandier, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, warned, offensive capabilities are needed for real deterrence: “No matter how thick a shield you build, you are still leaving it to the enemy to decide when to strike.”