Political Analysis
Unprecedented Escalation of Eastern DRC Conflict
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The resurgence of a 30-year conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with the Congolese armed forces and their allies fighting the M23 rebels supported by Rwanda has caused the displacement of more than 7 million people since 2022. Unlike in 2012, the M23 has gained territories beyond Goma, reaching South Kivu, where they have established parallel administrations. Regional efforts to halt the fighting and negotiate lasting peace remain unsuccessful.
M23/AFC now control large parts of North Kivu and South Kivu
HSS
Short but heavy fighting over Goma costing 3.000 lives
At the end of January 2025, the M23 and their ally from the AFC (Alliance Fleuve Congo), a politico-military coalition of Congolese opposition politicians frustrated by the Tshisekedi regime, with the help of Rwandese Defense Forces (RDF), took over the city of Goma after intense fighting. After days of chaos, confusion and continued clashes in Goma, their takeover of the city was not surprising since they had managed to do so in 2012, but rather the speed with which it was achieved. Barely a week later, the M23/AFC duo was able to seize the large neighboring city of Bukavu, in South Kivu. This time, with little resistance and even greater ease.
At a joint press conference in Goma days earlier, the leaders of M23/AFC announced their ambition to advance toward the capital city, Kinshasa, with the aim of overthrowing the current government. Despite increasing diplomatic pressure and sanctions imposed on Rwanda by various Western countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as the rupture of diplomatic relations with Belgium, the M23 continue their advance. Luanda announced the start of negotiations between the Congolese government and the M23 rebels, though these already face difficulties in implementation. It remains uncertain which demands President Felix Tshisekedi will accept – for instance, their political demands to be fully integrated into the Congolese government and institutions, as well as to receive their share of land as an ethnic minority in the country. This could lead to their military and administrative control of the Kivus, which would almost certainly be strengthened by Rwanda. According to the AFC leader Corneille Nangaa, the former head of the national electoral commission who declared Felix Tshisekedi the winner of the 2018 presidential elections, the aim of their coalition is to rebuild the state and restore peace in the whole of DRC.
How did we get here?
The M23 movement began as a rebellion by Tutsi army officers against the Congolese government, which they accused of violating the 23 March 2009 agreement that stipulated the integration of former Tutsi rebels into the regular army. On its own, the M23 could only have caused relatively minor unrest, like the hundreds of other armed groups in eastern DRC. However, indispensable structural and logistical support from Rwanda has enabled them to achieve the military strength they have today. Rwanda's involvement dates back to the 1994 genocide, in which members of the Hutu ethnic group killed more than 800.000 Tutsi within a few months, and later fled to neighboring Congo for refuge after a new Tutsi-led government was installed in Kigali. The Hutu perpetrators of the genocide soon became a security concern for Paul Kagame’s new government in Rwanda.
Rwanda’s presence in DRC follows two strands of argument: protection against security threats versus economic interest. The former appears to have degenerated from a plausible concern to a mere cover for exploiting DRC’s minerals. To this day, Rwanda justifies the presence of the RDF in the eastern DRC by its stated goal of eliminating the threat posed by extremist Hutu. These extremists have formed their own armed group, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which operates from border areas in the eastern part of the DRC. The Congolese government`s inability to secure its borders and territory in the face of of hundreds of militia groups has led the Rwandan government to at least claim responsibility for protecting its Tutsi minority living in eastern DRC. The M23 rebellion, which identifies as Congolese Tutsi and is making its own demands on the DRC government, has provided Kagame with an opportunity to expand his political influence in the region.
However, the largest interest driving the conflict is economic, as various rare minerals are found in eastern DRC. These minerals – such as cobalt, coltan and tin, to name just a few – are essential for the production of batteries for electric vehicles and smartphones. Minerals remain a key factor in the region's conflict. A report published by Global Witness in 2022 revealed that only an estimated 10% of the minerals exported by Rwanda were actually mined there, while the rest were smuggled from the DRC[1]. On the world market, Rwanda is positioning itself as a stable and reliable alternative, making it easier for international investors to trade through Rwandan companies rather than dealing with the logistical and reputational risks associated with the DRC. Given the rise in technological innovation and the global shift toward a green energy transition, these minerals are more strategic than ever. The timing is therefore favorable for the Rwandese government, as the M23 – now controlling large parts of North and South Kivu – can access the region’s minerals with reduced risk.
[1] Global Witness (2022), The ITSCI laundromat
M23 are through Rwandan military support better equipped and far more disciplined than the FARDC and their allies
M23 dominates the battlefield against FARDC and its allies
The presence of natural resources has been portrayed as a curse for the DRC, as control of the mines in the eastern part of the country is a major source of revenue for the militia groups. In response to the ongoing conflict, the United Nations (UN) deployed a peacekeeping mission over 20 years ago with the aim of stabilising the region. The UN peacekeeping mission, called MONUSCO, has no offensive mandate; its main objective is to support the FARDC in its efforts to protect civilians from armed militias. Although MONUSCO contributed to the defeat of M23 in 2013, when the group last took Goma, it has since come under heavy criticism from President Tshisekedi. Amid rising tensions, the Congolese government is now collaborating with an armed group called Wazalendo, made up of Congolese patriots fighting alongside the FARDC. Tshisekedi has also sought support from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces, the Burundian army, and has contracted Eastern European mercenaries to assist the FARDC against the M23/AFC rebellion, which is reportedly backed by an estimated 4.000 Rwandan soldiers.
Despite the presence of numerous allies, the FARDC was unable to stop the M23 advance and lost control of both Goma and Bukavu. Consequently, the SADC has decided to withdraw its troops from DRC. The Eastern European mercenaries have already left the country after receiving lucrative salaries. Given the immense military effort concentrated in and around Goma – and the fact that the city is now under M23 control – it is safe to say that the FARDC has been defeated on this front, at least, despite having more allies and international law on its side. Nevertheless, the Congolese army's evident weakness and the government's inability to protect its territory are creating widespread insecurity across the country, leaving room for rising crime and the possibility of a broader regional escalation.
Regional consequences not excluded
The presence of foreign armies on Congolese soil increases the risk of a third Congo War, with several African nations vying for influence in the region. Burundi and South Africa have actively fought alongside the Congolese army, leading to rising tensions between Rwanda and both Burundi and South Africa. Statements by President Paul Kagame indicating that Rwanda is not afraid of a confrontation with South Africa have left the region in a state of unease.
Uganda is another important player that often goes almost unnoticed. It has taken an ambiguous path in its relations with the DRC. Uganda supported the insurrection of former Congolese president of the Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who overthrew the Mobutu regime and seized power in 1997. Today, the Ugandan army is fighting alongside the FARDC against an Islamist terrorist group called the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which has ties to ISIS. The ADF operates in eastern DRC and carries out attacks on both the Ugandan and Congolese sides of the border. At the same time, Uganda has been accused – along with Rwanda – of supporting the M23 rebels. In recent days, the Ugandan army has deployed troops in the Congolese province of Ituri, officially to combat another militia active in the region. The situation in eastern Congo appears increasingly complex, as security responsibilities are effectively left to neighboring countries, which can, with ease and little oversight, deploy troops on Congolese territory. It would be naïve to believe that, given the DRC’s rich resources, the sole motivation for foreign involvement is to restore security. Thirty years of conflict have shown that no lessons have been learned.
Attempts at peace negotiations have failed so far
Regional diplomatic attempts have been made to find a peaceful solution to this long-standing conflict. The Nairobi Process is a regional peace initiative led by the East African Community (EAC) aimed at facilitating talks with non-state actors such as rebel groups, to achieve a peaceful resolution to conflict and instability in eastern DRC. However, the M23 was not part of these talks. The Luanda Process refers to efforts by the Angolan government to broker direct negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda, with the aim of reducing tensions between the two countries at the state level. Both were launched in 2022 and have failed due to the lack of parties involved to agree on the terms for launching real negotiations.
A joint summit was held in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, in February 2025, where a ceasefire and the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from DRC territory were agreed upon. The declaration did not mention the Rwandan armed forces, highlighting the Eastern Alliance’s alignment with Kigali. The Rwanda-backed M23 did not respect the ceasefire and continued its advance toward South Kivu. The African Union (AU) continues to encourage peace talks and the implementation of the Nairobi and Luanda Processes. The deterioration of security in the DRC since the beginning of the year raises questions about the authority and effectiveness of regional institutions and the adequacy of the measures taken in repeated, yet unsuccessful, attempts to bring lasting peace to the region.
In Kinshasa the posters are multiplying for the call to rally in support of the FARDC
What's for the future of the DRC?
The military weakness of the Congolese state – evident in persistent security gaps – has been underscored by the occupation of two eastern territories by a rebel group. The longer negotiations stall and the further the rebels advance in eastern DRC, the more fragile the state becomes. This situation has all the elements of a possible coup d'état. The progress of the M23/AFC toward Kinshasa, the capital 2.500 km away, depends largely on how far Rwanda is willing to go. Regional efforts have yet to produce a resolution. With the delayed imposition of sanctions on Rwanda, the impact of Western nations appears far more limited than in 2013, when the M23 was last defeated. At that time, U.S. President Obama demanded that President Kagame stop supporting the M23 and withdraw from the DRC. The key difference today is Rwanda's elevated diplomatic standing on the world stage. Western countries now view Rwanda as an important and reliable partner on the African continent. In 2022, the European Union provided the Rwandan army with €20 million for a peacekeeping mission in Mozambique. Military support is aligned with France's national interest, as a French energy company is active in Mozambique’s gas sector.
In 2023, the British government signed a migration agreement with Rwanda that provided for the deportation of irregular migrants from the UK to Rwanda. Although the UK Supreme Court later declared the plan illegal, it highlights Europe’s strong interest in Rwanda. Rwanda is also part of an agreement with the European Union aimed at securing EU access to critical raw materials – an agreement that is now under review to determine whether it should remain in place.
In the quest for increased diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the eastern DRC, it was ironically Qatar that emerged as a new mediator capable of bringing Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame to the table. Despite what appeared to be a diplomatic breakthrough in Doha of an immediate, unconditional ceasefire agreement, fighting continues in eastern DRC. The M23/AFC coalition is still seizing new territory and advancing westward toward Kisangani, on the banks of the great Congo River, which flows through the rainforest to the capital, Kinshasa.
Will Qatar’s diplomatic breakthrough bring tangible progress?
Qatar succeeded due its strong economic ties with both Rwanda and DRC. With major investments in both countries – including a 49% stake in RwandAir and a 60% stake in Bugesera Airport, south of Kigali – as well as growing interest in deepening relations with Congo through infrastructure projects such as airport construction, Qatar’s commitment is anything but altruistic. However, it has managed to achieve a breakthrough in a regional conflict with international repercussions, where many previous attempts have failed.
Ultimately, however, a resolution for lasting peace must be found within Congo’s domestic political arena. Regional and international leaders unanimously agree that the path to peace lies in dialogue with all stakeholders – something that President Tshisekedi refuses to do, particularly with the M23/AFC. Representatives of the Catholic and Evangelical churches in the DRC, for their part, have engaged in dialogue with all concerned parties, including the M23/AFC, President Kagame, and leaders of the Congolese opposition. The Church has historically played a central role in mediation efforts among the DRC’s political class. Nevertheless, it is up to the current president to invite all parties to the negotiating table and initiate peace talks.
The work of reconciling national unity is essential and will have to take place sooner or later. A rift in national unity has re-emerged – an issue the DRC believed it had overcome 20 years ago with the Sun City negotiations, which aimed reunify the country after divisions that triggered multiple armed rebellions. Although the current situation with the M23/AFC movement resembles Kabila's insurrection in 1997, today’s realities are different. However, the repercussions and consequences for the reconstruction of national unity are likely to be the same. Once again, the Congolese political elite will have to confront the issues of occupied territories, foreign influence in the DRC, and the presence of foreign soldiers – including those of Tutsi origin[2] – within the Congolese army.
There are no short-to-medium term prospects for the DRC government to regain all occupied territories. With the westward advance of the M23/AFC and the failed negotiations in Luanda, the Rwandan-backed rebels continue to plunge the DRC into an unprecedented phase of uncertainty.
[2] “Congolese Tutsis” also known as Banyamulunge are believed to be of probable Nilotic origin and migrated from Rwanda to the East of DRC in the 20th century during a repressive Hutu regime. In the Congolese national heritage, which includes more than 400 Bantu ethnic groups, Tutsis are not officially recognized. As a result of political events, Congolese Tutsi settled in the eastern part of the DRC, where they have lived for many decades.
Benita Pungwe, Programme Officer at the Hanns Seidel Foundation in DRC
Braunschaedel
About the Author
Benita Pungwe is the Programme Officer at the Hanns Seidel Foundation in DRC. After obtaining two bachelor’s degrees in Business and Economics in Germany and the UK, followed by an MA in International Relations in the USA, Benita moved to Kinshasa, where she works in direct collaboration with the Congolese civil society on the implementation of civic education measures in the DRC.
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