Short Article
Türkiye as a Regional Power - Assertive but Fragile

Map of Türkiye

iStock

Strategic Assertion and Regional Fault Lines

Türkiye is intensifying its pursuit of strategic autonomy amid shifting global power dynamics. This includes renewed efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue, though the process remains fragile due to the absence of legal frameworks, integration mechanisms, and inclusive political representation. The peace process is further strained by instability across the border, particularly the unchecked proliferation of Kurdish militias under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), operating near Türkiye’s frontiers. Damascus’s inability to rein in these militias complicates Ankara’s security calculus. If Ankara cannot contain transboundary threats, particularly from the SDF near Iraq, domestic peace could again unravel, as in 2015.

The situation in Syria and Iraq has fed the appetite of competing actors—Türkiye, Iran, Israel, and Gulf powers—entangling Ankara in complex rivalries. While Iran’s weakening may appear advantageous, it also threatens Türkiye’s energy security and border stability, and risks unleashing unregulated arms flows.[i] Meanwhile, Israel has expanded its strategic footprint in southern Syria. Its activities increasingly mirror Türkiye’s northern presence, creating de facto zones of external control and heightening competition.[ii] This not only challenges Türkiye’s plans to stabilise Kurdish-majority areas under its influence but also adds another layer of volatility to the regional power equation.

In this contested landscape—marked by Iranian retrenchment, Syrian fragmentation, Israeli activism, and Iraqi recalibration—Türkiye’s ambitions may enhance its middle-power status or falter under the weight of strategic overreach and unmanaged complexity.

Ukraine and the Black Sea Region

This drive for regional centrality extends northward. In the Black Sea, Türkiye has become a key defense partner for Ukraine. Joint ventures in UAVs, naval shipbuilding, and weapons systems continue despite the war, with Baykar building a drone factory in Ukraine. Türkiye also leads in post-war reconstruction—supporting infrastructure, demining, and housing—offering both technical value and geopolitical stability. For Europe, this cooperation presents an opportunity to reinforce regional capacity through a proven security-industrial model.

However, Türkiye has avoided sanctions on Russia, maintains strong trade with Moscow, and rejected NATO-based security guarantees favoured by Kyiv. Ukraine views Türkiye as a “partner, not an ally,”[iii] due to its reluctance to align fully with the Western-led Black Sea order. A core divergence lies, however,  in governance: Ukraine’s EU-oriented democratic path contrasts sharply with Türkiye’s authoritarian turn and frayed EU relations.

Relations with European Partners: Strategic Engagement Amid Structural Tensions

Türkiye’s engagement with European partners remains defined by a transactional logic that masks deeper normative divergence. While Ankara has positioned itself as an indispensable regional actor, European capitals remain wary of its authoritarian drift and coercive diplomacy.

Turkish-Greek Rapprochement: Realpolitik Without Reconciliation

Since late 2022, Turkish-Greek relations have entered a phase of relative normalisation. Symbolic meetings and crisis avoidance mechanisms have helped to lower tensions. Yet, the asymmetry in strategic threat perceptions remains profound. The current détente is a tactical pause, not a structural solution as core disputes remain..

Cyprus: Tactical Engagement, Strategic Deadlock

Ankara continues to insist on a two-state solution in Cyprus, rejecting the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot administration.[vi] However, it has not entirely disengaged from UN-led confidence-building measures, which have achieved modest progress in areas like cemetery restoration, youth cooperation, and demining.[v] This dual posture—sovereignty maximalism paired with selective cooperation—reflects Türkiye’s broader Mediterranean strategy: assert influence, consolidate presence, and avoid full diplomatic isolation.

Germany and France: Economic Depth vs. Normative Distance

Türkiye’s relationship with France has evolved toward pragmatic co-stabilisation. Despite clashing regional visions—in Libya, the Sahel, and the Eastern Mediterranean—Paris and Ankara are cooperating in fields such as energy security, counterterrorism, and migration.[vi]

Also under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Germany is recalibrating its Türkiye policy. Merz has described Türkiye as an "extremely valuable, important NATO partner"[vii] and Berlin is expected to pursue a more pragmatic, sector-based engagement, especially in energy, supply chain resilience, and defense. With bilateral trade reaching €55 billion in 2023 and Ankara targeting €60 billion, economic cooperation is deepening including closer ties in climate technology and industrial modernisation.[viii]

Nevertheless, Türkiye’s authoritarian backsliding limits the long-term depth of its EU engagement. The challenge for Europe lies in moving beyond pragmatism without principles, toward a framework that balances strategic necessity with democratic accountability

Geoeconomics, Trade Realignments, and Technological Ambiguity

Türkiye positions itself as a resilient production hub amid US–EU trade tensions, leveraging its customs union and strategic location. Yet its balancing act between Western markets and Chinese capital creates uncertainty. Aspirations for tech autonomy and soft BRICS alignment limit access to US ecosystems. Without reforming its economic model and legal framework, Türkiye risks becoming a transactional hub—appealing but lacking strategic depth.

Climate Change as a Strategic Risk

While Ankara participates in frameworks like the Paris Agreement, its climate commitments remain selective and tied to geo-economic goals. It positions itself as a bridge between fossil-fuel-rich producers (like Azerbaijan and the Gulf) and energy-hungry European markets, prioritising infrastructure and regulatory alignment over deep decarbonisation.

Türkiye uses climate diplomacy to project influence in the Balkans and Caucasus, presenting itself as a model for balancing growth and transition. Yet its long-term credibility depends on aligning rhetoric with domestic reforms—notably on coal phase-out, emissions, and carbon pricing.[xi] In essence, Türkiye’s green policy is growing more sophisticated but remains constrained by domestic political economy and a transactional regional approach.

Policy Recommendations:

• Engage Türkiye with Guardrails  - Acknowledge Türkiye’s middle-power role, but anchor diplomatic and economic ties to rule-based cooperation.

• Go Beyond Transactionalism - Reassess the limits of purely transactional relationship, which has thus far failed to constrain – and may have reinforced – Türkiye’s authoritarian tendencies. Tie partnerships to concrete benchmarks in rule of law, electoral integrity, and minority rights.

• Expand Infrastructure and Green Transition Cooperation - Deepen EU-Türkiye collaboration on infrastructure, energy, and climate. Ensure all initiatives meet EU regulatory standards to avoid reinforcing opaque or illiberal governance.

Sources

[i] Tür, Özlem (2025). Strategic Fault Lines in the Middle East: Türkiye Between Iran, Israel, and Syria, URL istanpol.org/en/post-strategic-fault-lines-in-the-middle-east-turkiye-between-iran-israel-and-syria (18.07.2025); Ellithy, Amr (2025). Rewriting the Rules of Trade and Connectivity between Turkey and Iraq, URL www.cats-network.eu/assets/cats/CATS_Network_Paper__Briefs/CATS_Network_Paper__No._21__08_July_2025.pdf (10.07.2025)

[ii] Karaveli, Halil (2025). Israel’s Supremacy Compels Turkey to Fortify Its Home Front, URL www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/734-israel’s-supremacy-compels-turkey-to-fortify-its-home-front.html (10 .07.2025); Aydıntaşbaş, Asli (2025). Axis of unease: Why Europeans should try to manage a Turkey-Israel rivalry, URL https://ecfr.eu/article/axis-of-unease-why-europeans-should-try-to-manage-a-turkey-israel-rivalry/

[iii] Vorotnyuk, Maryna (2025). Ukraine-Turkey Strategic Partnership in Security and Defence Navigating the Disruption of the European Security Order, URL www.cats-network.eu/assets/cats/CATS_Network_Paper__Briefs/CATS_Network_Paper__No._20__26.06.2025.pdf (10.07.2025)

[iv] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı (2025). Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: “Rum tarafı, Kıbrıs Türkü‘nü kendi öz vatanında parya yapmak istiyor”, URL www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-rum-tarafi-kibris-turkunu-kendi-oz-vataninda-parya-yapmak-istiyor (25.07.2025).

[v] UN News (2025). UN chief reports progress in Cyprus talks, urges swift implementation of trust measures, URL news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165427 (25.07.2025)

[vi] For more information, see Gasco, Riccardo and Ulysse Fournillon (2025). How France and Turkey can renew their ties in a shifting strategic order, URL www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/how-france-and-turkey-can-renew-their-ties-in-a-shifting-strategic-order/ (25.07.2025)

[vii] Filis, Constantinos (2025), Facing Merz’s Germany, URL www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1270164/facing-merzs-germany/ (25.07.2025)

[viii] Tadrist, Rayan (2025). Germany Refocuses Economic Relations with Türkiye.

Exploring Germany’s renewed focus towards strategic sectors in economic partnership with Türkiye, URL www.berlinglobal.org/index.php (25.07.2025)

[ix] Gümüşkaya, Havva (2025). 52 yılın en kurak dönemi: Büyükşehirlerde su krizi kapıda, URL www.birgun.net/haber/52-yilin-en-kurak-donemi-buyuksehirlerde-su-krizi-kapida-638229 (17.07.2025).

About the Author

Lucie Tungul graduated from Miami University, Ohio (international relations), and Palacky University in Olomouc (politics and European studies). Her areas of interest are European integration with a special focus on Europeanization, democratization, migration processes and identity discourses. She is currently Chair of the Academic Board at the political institute TOPAZ and Assistant Professor at the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the Faculty of Law, Palacky University, Czechia. She worked as assistant professor at Fatih University, Istanbul, between 2006 and 2016. She is a member of the Czech Political Science Association executive board. She published numerous articles, book chapters, books and policy papers. Her recent works include The Turkish Community in the Czech Republic:A Diaspora in the Making? (https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2020-0025), Diaspora activism in a non-traditional country of destination: the Gülen Movement in Czechia (https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2023.2291853), and Europeanisation and Eurasianism in Turkey and Ukraine (Routledge, 2025).