Political Analysis
Strategic Vulnerabilities: Hybrid Warfare Threats from Russia and China on Europe’s Critical Infrastructures
Word cloud with HYBRID WARFARE concept
iStock
In the rapidly evolving European security environment, the three key concepts of diversification, redundancy, and resilience will play a decisive strategic role. A holistic security approach - grounded in comprehensive civil-military cooperation and a renewed security culture - will be essential for the EU and NATO to effectively respond to the growing threat of state-sponsored cyberattacks and physical sabotage within the broader systemic confron-tation between democratic and authoritarian-dictatorial powers.
Since 2024, Russia has escalated its hybrid warfare, shifting from espionage and information-gathering to identifying vulnerabilities in European critical infrastructures (CIs)—including harbors and undersea systems—to sabotage them via European-based proxies (such as Russian diaspora groups, criminal organizations, and extremist networks).[1]
This sabotage by Russia, China, and proxies (including Houthi rebels) is not limited to Europe; it has become a global security challenge as the rules-based international order and Western democracies face growing threats. This new underwater warfare is closely tied to technological advances that expand deep-sea operational capabilities.[2]
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European governments and NATO largely overlooked Russia’s hybrid or grey zone tactics, especially sabotage threats against European CIs. The focus was on cyberattacks, especially state-sponsored strikes targeting Western Europe’s electricity sector, shaped by Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 and 2016, which left nearly 300,000 people without power for six hours.[3]
Rising Cybersecurity Challenges of Critical Energy Infrastructures
Recently, the global rise in sophisticated cyberattacks targeting industrial control centers has alarmed industries, governments, and cybersecurity experts. Attribution remains difficult, while offensive cyber capabilities become more accessible to states, terrorists, and criminals. Cyberattacks on critical information and industrial control systems (ICS) are expected to increase. Disruptive attacks on Critical (Energy) Infrastructures (CIs/CEIs) have already surpassed earlier predictions, driven largely by state-sponsored cyber warfare from Russia and China ramping up before the 2022 invasion. These attacks aim to destabilize Western democracies by disrupting services, sowing confusion, intimidation, and sabotaging infrastructure, as part of broader hybrid warfare.[4]
On May 10, 2022, the EU-27, UK, and US jointly attributed a February 24 cyberattack on the Viasat-operated KA-SAT satellite network to Russia. Intended to disrupt Ukrainian military communications, the attack also cut broadband satellite internet across Central Europe and disabled remote monitoring of 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany.[5]
Hostile malware is spreading exponentially, and many industrial computer systems—especially Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in power plants and CEIs—remain outdated, even in advanced economies, making them vulnerable. All CIs are connected to the internet and rely on stable electricity, making the energy sector an Achilles’ heel of political, social, and economic stability. Electricity and gas sectors have interdependencies between physical and digital infrastructures, increasing their vulnerability. New digital technologies and growing organizational complexity further heighten risks.[6]
Rapid adoption of new technologies like smart meters multiplies cybersecurity risks due to billions of IoT devices—networks of smart sensors communicating with each other. Many were introduced prematurely, lacking built-in security and adequate regulation, causing serious vulnerabilities and breaches, like the global WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017.[7]
Europe’s cybersecurity challenge is also geopolitical, as shown by Huawei and 5G technology. An internally fragmented EU risks becoming a pawn for authoritarian powers and struggles against a strategically assertive China pursuing long-term interests at Europe’s expense. For years, most European governments and industries underestimated 5G cybersecurity risks, lacking independent expertise. Only after US pressure starting in 2018 did EU states begin excluding Huawei equipment, widely seen as a Chinese state extension capable of embedding digital backdoors for espionage or disabling CIs during conflict.[8]
Another concern involves Chinese components in renewable energy systems, like power connectors in solar installations. These ‘rogue components’ may have undocumented communication channels, allowing remote access to bypass firewalls—potentially causing blackouts or damage by disabling or altering inverter settings. Experts estimate controlling 3-4 GW of energy could disrupt regional electricity. The European Solar Manufacturing Council notes that over 200 GW of Europe’s 338 GW solar capacity depends on Chinese inverters—equivalent to output of 200 nuclear plants. Lithuania has passed laws blocking remote access to Chinese inverters in installations over 100 kW to prevent sabotage or blackmail.[9]
The EU is working to keep up with evolving cybersecurity threats by introducing new frameworks and institutions: ENISA, the updated NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Solidarity Act, the European Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network, and a Blueprint for Cyber Crisis Management. This blueprint guide coordinated EU responses to large cyber incidents and improves cooperation among member states and partners like NATO.[10]
Despite progress, the EU’s preparedness and cyber defenses still lag sufficient sophisticated defensive capabilities against sophisticated cyber-offensive tools used by cybercriminals and state hackers. More awareness is also urgently needed to dispel myths about CEIs and operational technology. As digitalization, electrification, robotics, and AI transform energy and industry, cyberattacks are expected to rise in frequency and impact. The overall lack of cyber experts is particularly alarming in European electricity companies as the sector is especially vulnerable to hacking threats with cascading impacts on all other CIs (all dependent on a stable electricity supply) at a time when cyber-attacks have rapidly increased related to Russia’s Ukraine war.[11]
European Responses to Growing Sabotage of its Subsea Critical Infrastructures
Since the Nord Stream pipeline explosion in September 2022, European critical infrastructure vulnerabilities have become a major concern for NATO, the EU, and Germany. In October 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland was severely damaged, with a Hong Kong-flagged container ship suspected. Sabotage of CIs by Russia, China, and proxies like the Houthis is not limited to Europe but has become a global security challenge, linked to technological advances enabling deep-sea operations.[12]
NATO and the EU have mainly focused on cybersecurity, often overlooking physical sabotage risks to subsea pipelines and cables. For decades, cost-efficiency rather than resilience drove decisions in Western democracies. European discourse on Russian hybrid warfare was limited to experts, intelligence agencies, and some politicians.[13]
Warning signs of Russian sabotage were long downplayed, leading to Germany, Poland, Scandinavia, and the Baltics to become prime targets. Even before Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, European intelligence noted rising espionage against infrastructure, which escalated since late 2023 to physical sabotage.[14]
In Russia’s military doctrine, the distinction between traditional and hybrid warfare — using propaganda, sabotage, and disinformation as core tactics — is blurred or absent altogether. Even the Western separation between peacetime and wartime is not clearly acknowledged in Russian strategic culture.[15]The Russian navy has submarines trained for deep-sea sabotage and uses research vessels and intelligence units for these covert missions. New "Committees of Special Influence" coordinate intelligence operations, replacing earlier fragmented efforts. Investigations found nearly 1,000 instances of ‘loitering’ by about 170 Russian vessels near offshore wind farms, subsea cables, and pipelines—likely intelligence gathering for sabotage. Many ships disable their AIS transponders to avoid detection.[16]
Germany and other Baltic states report frequent GPS jamming and spoofing affecting civilian and military flights, disrupting operations and sometimes closing airports. Similar disruptions occur in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.[17] Russia’s evolving ‘grey zone’ tactics complicate Western responses, raising risks of escalation.
Figure 1: 
Source: WSJ 2025
Underwater infrastructures, including data and telecom cables, are critical to Europe’s internet and electricity supply. While cybersecurity investments have grown, physical protection has lagged. Since early 2024, at least 11 undersea internet and power cables have been damaged.[18] Informal NATO sources report about 25% of transatlantic-European data cables were out of service due to suspicious causes, not technical failures or fishing. [19]
Around 95% of international internet traffic relies on about 200 major submarine cables spanning 1.3 million km and handling $10 trillion daily. These cables converge at only 10 key landing points, which are vulnerable nodes. The strategic importance of subsea infrastructure also includes submarine power cables linking offshore renewables to grids - driven by the rapid expansion of offshore wind power and solar farms across Europe - making maritime infrastructure security a priority for the EU.
Figure 2: 
Source: Bloomberg 2025
Germany worries about sabotage threats to Norway’s energy infrastructure and has expanded LNG terminal capacity to reduce pipeline dependency.[20] U.S. intelligence-sharing challenges since the Trump era have complicated EU responses.
Chinese vessels have been implicated in sabotage operations in the Baltic Sea, signaling growing Russia-China coordination in hybrid warfare and rehearsing tactics for the Indo-Pacific, including around Taiwan.[21]
Physical protection of critical infrastructure received little attention for decades, with cost-efficiency prioritized over resilience. Now, with about 80% of Europe’s critical infrastructure privately operated, public-private partnerships (PPPs) must build shared security understanding and embed resilience in binding regulatory frameworks.
The EU has taken steps: the ‘Critical Entities Resilience Group’ and ‘Critical Infrastructure Resilience Recommendation’ (Dec 2022), the ‘EU-NATO Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Resilience’ and the ‘Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell’ (2023), and the ‘Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure’ at NATO MARCOM headquarters in the UK (2024). NATO’s ‘Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network’ launched in May 2024 advances protection strategies via expert cooperation.[22]
Three strategic principles guide future security: diversification, redundancy, and resilience. Active defense against state-sponsored sabotage with advanced military means will remain limited, so prioritization is essential, focusing on vulnerable nodes like landing stations and hubs. Measures include enhanced monitoring, regulatory coordination, redundancy, and closer public-private collaboration.
The German Navy has increased patrols in the Baltic and North Seas, launched the German-Polish Action Plan, strengthened Baltic and Nordic cooperation, and supports NATO exercises like BALTOPS and Baltic Sentry. Still, NATO naval forces face operational limits patrolling vast maritime domains.[23]
Finland’s December 2024 seizure of a Russian ‘shadow oil tanker’ linked to sabotage of electricity and communication cables highlights the need for stronger enforcement to deter such acts involving Russian and Chinese vessels.[24]
Autonomous unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles (UAVs/UUVs) and AI offer cost-effective surveillance and defense, potentially supplementing traditional patrols.[25] Maritime domain awareness is further enhanced by satellites, radar, sensors, sonar, and AI analytics. New fiber-optic sensor tech detects cable vibrations in real time, enabling rapid responses and improved NATO maritime situation awareness.[26]
Protection also poses legal and regulatory challenges. With most critical infrastructure privately operated, public-private consensus on security embedded in sustainable regulations is vital. Institutionalized PPPs and the principles of diversification, redundancy, and resilience must be systematically applied.[27]
Europe needs adequate repair capacity and strategic reserves of submarine cables. Globally, about 50 cable-laying and repair vessels exist; Europe has only four privately owned cable ships, insufficient for rising threats. These assets may not be available immediately after incidents, posing strategic risks. Europe must consider nationalizing, leasing, or co-financing cable ships to ensure rapid emergency response.[28]
Strategic Perspectives
EU and NATO are still struggling with attribution and effective responses to low-intensity sabotage attacks — such as arson or interference with subsea cables — without triggering NATO Article 5. These incidents, often falling into the ‘grey zone’” highlight the urgent need for coordinated strategies to counter Russia’s and China’s hybrid threats.
To address these evolving risks, a comprehensive civil-military cooperation strategy is required — especially in the field of AI-enabled dual-use technologies, which increasingly blur the lines between civilian innovation and military applications. Protecting Europe’s CIs — especially maritime and subsea cables, essential for communication, Internet, and power transmission — has become a strategic imperative. A holistic Western security and resilience concept must include:
- Clearly defined crisis mechanisms with assigned responsibilities between government agencies and private CI operators.
- Networked security concepts and redundant capabilities for rapid subsea cable repairs (including vessels, cable reserves, and technical equipment).
- Resilience “by design”: Mandatory integration of cutting-edge sensor and monitoring technologies in new CI developments.
- Enhanced public awareness and strategic communication to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns.
- Proactive counter-information strategies directed toward authoritarian regimes, reminiscent of Cold War-era information campaigns.
Furthermore, closer EU-NATO coordination is required to strengthen collective resilience. Ultimately, the security of the EU and NATO’s CI protection strategies is only as strong as the weakest link—i.e., the national resilience levels of each member state.
Looking beyond Russia, Western intelligence services warn of an even greater long-term espionage and sabotage threat from China. In 2022, the President of Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Thomas Haldenwang, warned: “Russia is the storm. China is the climate change.”[29]
Sources
[1] See Frank Umbach, ’The Challenges of Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure’, in: A.Piebalgs/ B.Schmitt/ Frank Umbach, ‘Building Energy Resilience from the Seabed up’, European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES), London-Washington D.C., July 2024, pp. 12-15; Minna Alander/Patrik Oksanen, ‘Tracking the Russian Hybrid Warfare’, Frivärld, 27 May 2024; Arsalan Bilal, ‘Russia’s Hybrid War against the West’, NATO-Review, 26 April 2024; Bart Schuurman, ‘Russia Is Stepping up is Covert War Beyond Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, 10 January 2025; Andrei Soldatov/Irina Borogan, ‘Arsonist, Killer, Saboteur, Spy’, Foreign Affairs, 20 March 2025, and Europol, ‘The Changing DNA of Serious and Organised Crime 2025’, Luxembourg 2025.
[2] See also Alex Gilbert/Morgan D. Bazilian, ‘The Seabed is now a Battlefield’, Foreign Policy, 4 June 2025.
[3] See Frank Umbach, ’Russia’s Cyber Fog in the Ukraine War’, Geopolitical Intelligence Service (GIS), 16 June 2022; idem, ‘The Rise of State-Supported Cyberattacks from Russia’, GIS, 19 November 2019, and idem, ‘Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen im Zeitalter von Cybersecurity’, Mittler-Brief 2/2017.
[4] See also Raphael Minder/Henry Foy, ’Prague Blames Beijing for Cyber Attack on Foreign Ministry’, Financial Times (FT), 28 May 2025 (https://www.ft.com/content/8f9fd267-ab58-4f12-8b99-2b5166626622); Imran Rahman-Jones/Chris Vallance, ‘UK Exposes Russian Cyber Campaign Targeting Support for Ukraine’, BBC, 21 May 2025 (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c17rrjdr79po); Frank Umbach, ‘Russia’s Cyber Fog in the Ukraine War’, and idem, ‘The Rise of State-Supported Cyberattacks from Russia’.
[5] See Frank Umbach, ’Russia’s Cyber Fog in the Ukraine War’.
[6] See also Frank Umbach, ‘Strengthening Energy Security and Building Resilience in the Asia–Pacific’, (Bangkok: United Nations-Economic and Social Committee in Asia and Pacific/UN-ESCAP, 2021), pp. 34 ff., and idem, 'Energy Security in a Digitalized World and its Geostrategic Implications’ (Hong Kong: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, September 2018), pp. 12 ff., 42 ff. and 104 ff.
[7] See ibid. A recent example is also the Spanish outage on April 28, 2025, though not all reasons and causes have been made public, whilst the Spanish government, the grid operator and utilities have accused each other. Officially there was no cyber-attack causing the outage, but an analysis of it identified significant cyber vulnerabilities that need to be fixed as soon as possible – Barney Jopson, ‘Spain Blackout Faults both Grid Operator and Utilities’, FT, 17 June 2025 (https://www.ft.com/content/73231e72-f825-44c7-b601-dfa907f28e1e).
[8] See also Daniel Voelsen, ‘5G, Huawei and the Security of Our Communication Networks’, SWP-Aktuell No. 5, Berlin, February 2019; Frank Umbach, ‘EU Policies on Huawei and 5G Wireless Networks. Economic-Technological Opportunities vs. Cybersecurity Risks’. Working Paper No. 332, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)/ Nanyan Technological University NTU, Singapore, 23 December 2020, and idem, ‘Europe and Huawei: Rising Cybersecurity Challenges’, GIS, 2 April 2020.
[9] See Sarah Mcfarlane, ‘Ghost in the Machine? Rogue Communication Devices Found in Chinese Inverters’, Reuters, 14 May 2025 (https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/ghost-machine-rogue-communication-devices-found-chinese-inverters-2025-05-14/); Marlen Rein, ‘Dependency on Chinese Clean Energy Technology: Risks and Challenges for Energy and Cyber Security’, NATO Energy Security Centre for Excellence, Vilnius 2025; Benedikt Fuest, ‘Blackout per Fernsteuerung’, Welt am Sonntag, 1 June 2025, p. 17 (https://epaper.welt.de/?group=3324); Demetri Sevastopulo/Rachel Millard/Jim Pickard, ‘US Warns Britain over Chinese Wind Farm Security Risks’, FT, 18 June 2025 (https://www.ft.com/content/8f9fd267-ab58-4f12-8b99-2b5166626622), and Ilaria Mazzocco, ‘Balancing Act: Managing European Dependencies on China for Climate Technologies’, CSIS, Washington, 13 December 2023.
[10] See European Council, ‘EU Adopts Blueprint to better Manage European Cyber Crises and Incidents’, Brussels, Press Release, 6 June 2025.
[11] See also Catherine Stupp, ‘European Electricity Sector Lack Cyber Experts as Ukraine War Raises Hacking Risks’, Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 9 December 2022 (https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-electricity-sector-lacks-cyber-experts-as-ukraine-war-raises-hacking-risks-11670605079).
[12] See also Alex GilberftMorgan D. Bazilian, ‘The Seabed is now a Battlefield’, Foreign Policy, 4 June 2025.
[13] See Benjamin L. Schmitt/Michal Kurtyka/Alan Rily, ‘Underwater Mayhem: Countering Threats to Energy and Critical Infrastructure across the NATO Alliance and beyond’, University of Pennsylvania, May 2025; Frank Umbach, ’The Challenges of Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure’, in: A.Piebalgs/ B.Schmitt/Frank Umbach, ‘Building Energy Resilience from the Seabed up’, and idem, ’New Challenges in Protecting Critical EU Infrastructure’, GIS, 6 February 2023, and idem, ‘Neue Sicherheitsherausforderungen: Schutz kritischer (Unterwasser-)Infrastrukturen in Deutschland und der EU‘, Europäische Sicherheit und Technik (ES&T), January 2023, pp. 31-34.
[14] See also Julian Staib, ‘Deutschlands wichtigster Hafen im Visier von Saboteuren‘, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 14 May 2025 (https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/hybride-angriffe-hafen-von-hamburg-im-visier-von-saboteuren-110473634.html); ‘”Es brennt quasi überall“: Geheimdienst warnt vor Russland‘, T-Online, 14 October 2024 (https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/aussenpolitik/id_100509580/russland-ruestet-massiv-auf-deutsche-geheimdienste-fordern-mehr-befugnisse.html); Bart Schuurman, ‘Russia Is Stepping up its Covert War Beyond Ukraine‘, and Andrei Sldatov/Irina Borogan, ‘Arsonist, Killer, Saboteur, Spy‘.
[15] See The President of the Russian Federation, ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russia’, Moscow 2014 (https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029); idem, ‘The Basic Principles of State policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence’ (https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094), and idem, ‘Russlands neue Nukleardoktrin und die Zukunft nuklearer Rüstungskontrolle’, ES&T 7/2020, pp. 20-24.
[16] See Frank Umbach, ‘Neue Sicherheitsherausforderungen: Schutz kritischer (Unterwasser-)Infrastrukturen in Deutschland und der EU‘.
[17] See ‘Polish Researchers Detect Ship-Based GPS Jammers in Baltic Sea‘, Maritime-Executive, 3 March 2025 (https://maritime-executive.com/index.php/article/polish-researchers-detect-ship-based-gps-jammers-in-baltic-sea), and Philipp Rall, ‘Russlands geheime Schattenflotte in der Ostsee: Studie enthüllt geheime Manöver‘, Futurezone, 4 March 2025 (https://www.futurezone.de/science/article626345/in-der-ostsee-operation-schattenflotte-enthuellt.html), and Konstantin Eggert, ‘GPS Jamming in the Baltic Region: Is Russia Responsible?’, DW, 5 May 2024 (https://www.dw.com/en/gps-jamming-in-the-baltic-region-is-russia-responsible/a-68993942).
[18] See Klaudia Maciata, ‘Fortifying the Baltic Sea – NATO Defence and Deterrence Strategy for Hybrid Threats’, NATO, 5 May 2025 (https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2025/05/05/fortifying-the-baltic-sea-natos-defence-and-deterrence-strategy-for-hybrid-threats/index.html) and John Leicester/Emma Burrows, ’11 Baltic Cables Damaged in 15 Months, Pushing NATO to Boost Security’, Defensenews, 28 January 2025 (https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/01/28/11-baltic-cables-damaged-in-15-months-pushing-nato-to-boost-security/, and; Bojan Pancevski, ‘Russia Suspected as Baltic Undersea Cables Cut in apparent Sabotage’, WSJ, 20 November 2024 (https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-suspected-as-baltic-undersea-cables-cut-in-apparent-sabotage-801cb392).
[19] Lisa-Martine Klein, ‘Deutschland verliert sich beim Schutz seiner maritimen Infrastruktur in Details‘, Table Briefings, 15 January 2024, https://table.media/security/analyse/deutschland-verliert-sich-beim-schutz-seiner-maritimen-infrastruktur-in-details/
[20] See Frank Umbach, ‘Die LNG-Versorgungssicherheit der EU: Ausreichende Kapazitäten oder Stranded Assets?‘, Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, May 2023, pp. 24-29 and idem, ‘The European Union’s LNG Supply Security‘, GIS, 30 March 2023.
[21] See also Richard Mine/Oliver Telling, ‘Chinese Vessel Spotted where Baltic Sea Cables were Severed’, FT, 20 November 2024 (https://www.ft.com/content/383516a5-02db-46cf-8caa-a7b26a0a1bb2); ‘Questions Raised over Chinese Ship Seen near Undersea Baltic Cables’, Radio Free Asia, 21 November 2024 (https://www.rfa.org/english/china/2024/11/21/china-baltic-cargo-vessel-undersea-cables/); Sophia Besch/Erik Brown, ‘A Chinese-Flagged Ship Cut Baltic Sea Internet Cables. This Time, Europe was more Prepared’, Carnegie, 3 December 2024, and Richard Milne, ‘Sweden Criticises China for Refusing full Access to Vessel Suspected of Baltic Sea Cable Sabotage’, FT, 22 December 2024 (https://www.ft.com/content/9094dcc4-b0f8-4191-b6f6-d1196a5f2822).
[22] See also Benjamin Schmitt, ‘Responding to Russia’s Longstanding Weaponisation of Energy’ in: A.Piebalgs/ B.Schmitt/Frank Umbach, ‘Building Energy Resilience from the Seabed up’, pp. 7-11; and Arsalan Bilal, ‘Russia’s Hybrid War against the West’, and ‘NATO Promises better Strategy against Cyber Attacks and Undersea Cables’, Euractiv, 4 December 2024 (https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence/news/nato-promises-better-strategy-against-cyber-attacks-and-undersea-cables/).
[23] See Klaudia Maciata, ‘Fortifying the Baltic Sea – NATO Defence and Deterrence Strategy for Hybrid Threats’; Benjamin L. Schmitt/Michal Kurtyka/Alan Rily, ‘Underwater Mayhem: Countering Threats to Energy and Critical Infrastructure across the NATO Alliance and beyond’; Daniel Michaels, ‘How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage’, WSJ, 30 March 2025 (https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/nato-russia-undersea-cable-pipeline-prevention-212d93ff), and Sean Monaghan et.al., ‘NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure’, CSIS-Briefs, December 2023.
[24] See Richard Mine, ‘Finland Seizes Russian Shadow Fleet Oil Tanker after Cable Cutting Incident’, FT, 26 December 2024 (https://www.ft.com/content/0c208ac1-f416-41b2-a373-ec7f90b84ca8), and A.Piebalgs/ B.Schmitt/Frank Umbach, ‘Building Energy Resilience from the Seabed up’, European Initiative for Energy Security.
[25] See Frank Umbach, ’The Challenges of Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure’; William Boston, ‘How AI can Protect Vital Pipelines and Cables deep in the Ocean’, WSJ, 17 February 2025 (https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/ai-military-applications-mapping-aca7f486).
[26] See Frank Umbach, ’The Challenges of Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure’.
[27] See also ibid.; Patricia Schneider, ‘Schutz maritimer Kritischer Infrastruktur in der Ostsee: Braucht es den Schuss vor den Bug?‘, Federal Academy for Security Policies (BAKS), Berlin, Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik No. 4/2025, and Moritz Brake, ‘Der erste Schuss des nächsten Krieges könnte auf See fallen‘, FAZ, 29 May 2025 (https://www.faz.net/pro/weltwirtschaft/sicherheit/der-erste-schuss-des-naechsten-krieges-koennte-auf-see-fallen-110494938.html).
[28] See Frank Umbach, ’The Challenges of Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure’, and idem, ‘Neue Sicherheitsherausforderungen: Schutz kritischer (Unterwasser-)Infrastrukturen in Deutschland und der EU‘.
[29] Quoted following Sarah Marsh, ‘German Spy Chief: 'Russia is the Storm, China is Climate Change', Reuters, 17 October 2022 (https://www.reuters.com/world/german-spy-chief-russia-is-storm-china-is-climate-change-2022-10-17/).
Frank Umbach
About the Author
Dr. Frank Umbach is Head of Research of the European Custer for Climate, Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS (previously Research Director of EUCERS as part of King’s College in London from 2010-2020)at the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS), University of Bonn/Germany; Senior Lecturer at the University of Bonn; Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyan Technological University (NTU) in Singapore and international and strategic senior consultant on energy security as well as resource/raw material supply resilience, geopolitical risks (management), cyber security and critical (energy) infrastructure protection (CEIP), and security policies in Europe/Russia/Eurasia and Asia-Pacific. He is also a NATO-consultant on energy security and geopolitics since 2012 and an author of more than 600 publications.
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