Short Article
Late To The Party: Finland and Sweden’s First Year(s) in NATO

NATO Milestones Overshadowed by Uncertainty

On 11 March 2025, an American B-52 strategic bomber flew over Stockholm and Uppsala at low altitude, accompanied by two Swedish Gripen fighter jets. The overflight was part of a wider NATO exercise but planned to mark Sweden’s first anniversary as NATO member a few days earlier, on March 7th. However, the manoeuvre’s intended deterrence signal has been dampened by the Trump administration’s repeated suggestions of only conditional commitment, at best, to continue providing extended nuclear deterrence for the European allies who depend on it.

While Sweden’s first and Finland’s second anniversary as NATO members is a historic occasion, the feelings are as mixed as the Trump administration’s messaging. On the military-to-military level, transatlantic relations have so far remained on course and the United States (US) is still present in military exercises in both Finland and Sweden and the new members’ integration into the alliance is progressing swiftly. Joining NATO was, especially in the Finnish context, mostly about seeking alliance with the US. That is why it was so important for Finland to prospectively be moved under the Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk in the US, and not to remain permanently under the European JFC Brunssum in the Netherlands, which has been an interim solution until JFC Norfolk can build up sufficient capacity to integrate the new members. 

Selling NATO in the Trump Era

The strong emphasis on a new era in relations with the US has been a central theme in the Finnish public debate on NATO membership, to a large extent also due to the significantly increased, almost nonstop, US military presence in the country since applying for membership. Partially reinforced through official rhetoric, the bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed with the US in 2023 was often misunderstood to be the “actual” deterrent or a practical implementation of NATO’s Article V security guarantee[i], although the DCAs that the US has concluded with a multitude of countries all over the globe (in 2023 in addition to Finland and Sweden also with the Czech Republic and Papua New Guinea) mainly serve the purpose of creating a legal framework to enable US presence in the partner countries but does not obligate the US to anything. In Finland and Sweden, the focus was mainly on the big picture that the bilateral DCAs created in the Nordic region, as Norway had just concluded an update of its DCA with the US and Denmark was negotiating one at the same time with Finland and Sweden. While concluding the DCAs with the new NATO members was a small legal step for the US, it was a big mental step for Finland and Sweden, where US military presence in the countries was unthinkable for a long time.

For both countries, the sudden American U-turn under President Donald Trump has presented a tough dilemma. Having invested political capital in convincing the populations that a transatlantic turn will help increase the countries’ security, both the Finnish and the Swedish government now have a hard time finding words to accurately respond to the recent developments. As a result, the gap between public debate and official political rhetoric on NATO membership and relations with the US is currently widening by the day.

In the Finnish public debate, the so far undisturbed military cooperation with American forces has compelled former generals to vehemently argue that the US is not leaving Europe because it needs Europe.[ii] That the US needs military presence and bases in Europe if it wants to maintain its global power position is in itself a sound argument, but does not take into consideration that such logical considerations may not be of much relevance to the current U.S. administration. Meanwhile in Sweden, which had its own nuclear weapons programme during the Cold War, the debate about possible Swedish or Nordic nuclear weapons has become an everyday topic on the radio, discussed in one programme alongside a new interpretation of Hamlet and the health benefits of artichoke.[iii]

Map of the geographic situation of Nord Baltic Eight countries. Nordic countries (Demark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) are painted in blue and Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are painted in green.

MPT2011; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nord_Baltic_Eight_map.png

Regional Alignment in a Changing Transatlantic Landscape

Regardless of the future US role in Europe, however, Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership has had a positive effect on regional cohesion. The new members closed the geographical gap between the Baltic States and the Norwegian High North, which has brought new strategic clarity into the wider Baltic-Nordic-Arctic region. At the same time, the Nordic and Baltic countries have become increasingly aligned politically. They are united in their threat perception of Russia and share a strong sense of urgency to support Ukraine, for the sake of wider European security. The eight small countries, ranging from Estonia’s population of one million to Sweden’s ten million, are all in the top ten of Ukraine’s supporters – some, like Denmark, both as share of GDP and in absolute terms.[i] The foreign and security policy alignment has fostered overall positive relations between the Nordic and Baltic countries and there is momentum for cooperation also in other sectors. Together, the Nordic-Baltic 8 now form one important centre of gravity in Europe.

[i] Kervinen, Elina (2023): Suomi saa vahvan pelotteen, ja se on myös Yhdysvaltojen intressi [Finland gets a strong deterrent, and that is also in US interest], Helsingin Sanomat, 14.12.2023, https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000010051034.html 

[ii] Hyytinen, Tuomas (2025): “Yhdysvallat ei ole jättämässä Eurooppaa” – suomalaiskenraalit eivät pelkää Trumpia [“The US is not leaving Europe” – Finnish generals do not fear Trump], Yle, 19.2.2025, https://yle.fi/a/74-20144346 

[iii] Sveriges Radio (2025): Bo Hagströms kronärtskockor, Hamlet och svenska kärnvapen [Bo Hagström’s artichokes, Hamlet, and Swedish nuclear weapons], 11.3.2025, https://www.sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/bo-hagstroms-kronartskockor-hamlet-svenska-karnvapen 

[iv] Associated Press (2025): Greenland’s new leader has a message for Trump: ‘We do not belong to anyone’, CNN, 31.3.2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/31/europe/greendland-trump-us-pushback-intl-hnk/index.html 

[v] Lien, Kersti and Egelandsdal, Pontus (2025): Klar tale fra Barth Eide: – Må stå sterkt imot [Clear words from Barth Eide: - Must stand firm], Nettavisen, 25.3.2025, https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/utenriksminister-espen-barth-eide-er-klar-pa-at-norge-og-norden-ma-sta-sterkt-imot-donald-trumps-onske-om-a-kjopte-gronland/s/5-95-2354109 (accessed 7.4.2025); SVT (2025) Kristersson kritiserar amerikansk Grönlandsresa: ”Tät kontakt med Frederiksen” [Kristersson criticises the Amercian Greenland visit: “In close contact with Frederiksen”], 26.3.2025, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/kristersson-kritiserar-amerikansk-gronlandsresa-tat-kontakt-med-fredriksen 

[vi] Högmander, Visa (2025) Stubb: Grönlantilaisten tulevaisuus on grönlantilaisten päätettävissä, MTV Uutiset, 1.4.2025, https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/suora-lahetys-noin-kello-8-45-presidentti-stubb-puhuu-pohjoismaiden-neuvoston-istunnossa/9129692 

[vii] Helsingin Sanomat (2025): Trump sai suomalaiset menettämään uskonsa yhdysvaltoihin [Trump made Finns lose their faith in the US], 8.4.2025, https://www.hs.fi/paakirjoitukset/art-2000011150872.html 

[viii] Sjögren, Anna (2025): Kristersson: Nytta av att det finns kärnvapen i Europa [Kristersson: Useful to have nuclear weapons in Europe], Aftonbladet, 5.3.2025, https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/LMQbop/trump-och-sakerhetslaget-6mars?pinnedEntry=1345313; Nykänen, Maria (2025): Orpo MTV:lle: Euroopan omasta ydinasepelotteesta keskusteltava – "Yhdysvallat on muuttunut" [Orpo to MTV: A European nuclear deterrent must be discussed – “The US has changed”], MTV Uutiset, 8.3.2025, https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/orpo-mtv-lle-euroopan-omasta-ydinasepelotteesta-keskusteltava-yhdysvallat-on-muuttunut/9114748 

[ix] Svt (2025): Sverigedemokraterna: I det här läget behövs EU [Sweden Democrats: In this situation, the EU is needed], 6.3.2025, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/sverigedemokraterna-i-det-har-laget-behovs-eu 

[x] Knutson, Mats (2025): ”Misstron mot USA speglar oron i Sverige” [“Mistrust of the USA reflects uncertainty in Sweden”], Svt, 13.3.2025, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/misstron-mot-usa-speglar-oron-i-sverige 

[xi] Kiel Institute for the World Economy (2025): Ukraine Support Tracker, data updated 14.2.2025,  https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/ 

About the Author

Minna Ålander is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House Europe Programme, a Non-resident Fellow at CEPA Transatlantic Defense and Security programme, and a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum. Previously, she worked at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Her research focuses on Northern European and Arctic security, Nordic defence cooperation, NATO, as well as wider European security. Her expertise also includes German foreign, security and defence policy.