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TRUMP II AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: FROM “MAXIMUM PRESSURE” TO DEAL OR CAPITULATION?

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Trump reinstates “maximum pressure” on Iran while expressing desire for new nuclear deal

In early February 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the first cornerstones of his long-awaited Iran policy. On one hand, on February 4, Trump signed a new Executive Order reinstating his first-term “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, also pledging to drive Iranian oil exports to zero. In fact, the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) – formal statements that announce presidential decisions, establish policy, and inform other departments and agencies of the decisions and their related responsibilities – that Trump signed states “restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad.” The NSPM establishes a number of policy goals: “Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralized; and Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered.” The order directs the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury – which is in charge of sanctions – “to impose maximum economic pressure on the Government of Iran, including by sanctioning or imposing enforcement mechanisms on those acting in violation of existing sanctions. The Treasury Secretary will also issue guidance for all relevant business sectors – including shipping, insurance, and port operators – about the risks to any person that knowingly violates U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran or an Iranian terror proxy. The Secretary of State will also modify or rescind existing sanctions waivers and cooperate with the Secretary of Treasury to implement a campaign aimed at driving Iran’s oil exports to zero. The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations will work with key allies to complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” The NSPM also reads: “Iran’s behavior threatens the national interest of the United States; it is therefore in the national interest to impose maximum pressure on the Iranian regime to end its nuclear threat, curtail its ballistic missile program and stop its support for terrorist groups.”

However, in his own statements accompanying his signing of the order, Trump engaged in some kind of backtracking regarding “maximum pressure”, trying to qualify its use and expressing clear uneasiness about signing it. For instance, he said that the Executive Order would serve as a threat to Iran: If Tehran continued to pursue a nuclear weapon or engage in terrorism, the U.S. would impose devastating economic sanctions. Yet, it is unclear how this is meant, since per NSPM “maximum pressure” has been restored. Upon signing the order, he said: “This is one that I’m torn about... It’s very tough on Iran... I’m going to sign it, but hopefully, we’re not going to use it very much... we have to be strong and firm... Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon.” “Everybody wants me to sign it,” he told journalists as he signed the “maximum pressure” order in the Oval Office on February 4. “I’ll do that. It’s very tough on Iran. It’s what we had before. I’m going to sign it, but hopefully we’re not going to have to use it very much. We will see whether or not we can arrange or work out a deal with Iran and everybody can live together.” He then added: “Maybe that’s possible. And maybe it’s not possible. So I’m signing this, and I’m unhappy to do it.” Moreover, also on February 4, Trump repeatedly said Iran should never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. However, as in the past, he refused to answer questions about whether the U.S. would either greenlight or support Israel in potential attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, after the latter had knocked out Iranian air-defense systems during its April and October 2024 air assaults, leaving Tehran’s nuclear program quite vulnerable. 

Later on February 4, at a joint press conference with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House – the first foreign leader to have visited Trump in his second term as U.S. president – Netanyahu applauded Trump’s first-term Iran policy, including the withdrawal from the  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, and the implementation of “maximum pressure” sanctions. This time, he added that Israel would hope “to finalize the job” with Iran – a probable reference to Israel’s dismantling of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East and its heavy hits against Iran’s air defenses and missile capabilities. Moreover, he claimed that on Iran Israeli and U.S. interests would fully overlap. 

On the other hand, a few hours later, in an early-morning post on February 5 on his social-media site Truth Social, Trump pledged to negotiate a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Tehran, saying he wants to avoid a military confrontation by reaching a deal that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In his social-media post, Trump said he hoped to reach an accommodation with Tehran, which would avoid the need for either economic pressure or military attacks against Iran. In this vein, he wrote: “Reports that the United States, working in conjunction with Israel, is going to blow Iran into smithereens, ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED.” He added: “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.” Also, Trump stated that the U.S. and Iran “should start working on it immediately, and have a big Middle East Celebration when it is signed and completed.” He added: “I want Iran to be a great and successful Country, but one that cannot have a Nuclear Weapon,”.

Furthermore, other senior Washington officals offered their own view as well as expectations on Iran policy. For instance, in a February 5 Space conversation on X, Trump’s National Security Advisor Mike Waltz – seen as an Iran hawk – said that the U.S. and Israel were on the same page when it came to Iran not acquiring a nuclear weapon, for which all options would be on the table. Moreover, prior to the Trump–Netanyahu meeting, leading Republican Senator Ted Cruz, member of the Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism of the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, expressed his expectations: “I hope to see maximum pressure on Iran, cutting off their oil revenues and doing everything we can to stop the Ayatollah.” Later, on February 7, Cruz had a two-hour meeting with Netanyahu. Reporting about his meeting, Cruz said they both agreed that one had to go “after the head of the snake”, i.e. Iran, and that with the return of Trump a new era had begun on Iran policy as opposed to the path pursued by the Biden administration.

Trump’s Iran policy scenarios

There are apparent tensions and contradictions in Washington on Iran policy, both within the Trump administration and beyond.

In the administration, there is both tension and a consensus on Iran. On one hand, Trump himself has made clear that he only reluctantly signed the restoration of “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran, while his preference would lie in a new nuclear deal with Iran in order to block it from acquiring the nuclear bomb: “We will see if we can work out a deal with Iran.” Is Trump now advocating a similar policy that he had ferociously criticized former President Barack Obama for? In May 2018, when Trump unilaterally withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA, he called the Obama-negotiated deal “defective at its core”, “horrible”, and the “worst deal ever made” – which he reiterated at the joint press conference with Netanyahu. Trump had criticized the JCPOA also on grounds that it had excluded U.S. business from Iran. Given this context, one could assume that Trump’s preference for a deal with Iran, along with his numerous statements over the past months expressing his hope for a “prosperous Iran,” may reflect his businessman-like attitude. He may be seeking a way for U.S. businesses to re-enter Iran. At the same time, it could also align with his aspiration to present himself as a Middle East peacemaker, aiming to make this a major legacy of his presidency.

 On the other hand, other Trump administration officials—chief among them Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz—along with senior U.S. policymakers, such as Ted Cruz and other prominent Republican figures, as well as the powerful pro-Israel lobby, are rather advocating for a simple return to Trump’s first-term Iran policy, which was centered solely on “maximum pressure” . From their viewpoint, at the present time, they can be satisfied from Trump’s performance given his restoration of “maximum pressure”.

Meanwhile, it is unclear whether Trump seeks a new nuclear deal or a more comprehensive one. Likewise, it is not clear to what extent Trump wants to leverage “maximum pressure” to obtain a comprehensive deal with the Islamic Republic.  He may aim to exploit Iran’s historically weak position as a regional power to extract concessions that go well beyond the nuclear issue—namely, Iran’s support for anti-Israel and anti-U.S. militias across the Middle East, as well as its missile program.

Khamenei suddenly rejects negotiations with the U.S., fearing a Trump diktat

On Iran’s part, officials exhibited various positions – ranging from willingness to engage in negotiations with Washington all the way to an outright rejection thereof by the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. 

On one hand, reacting to Trump’s restoration of “maximum pressure”, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in a routine manner, said: “Maximum pressure is a failed experiment, and trying it again will lead to another failure.” He added: “If the main issue is that Iran does not pursue nuclear weapons, this is achievable and there is no problem.” At the same time, on February 4, Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) – a top establishment body tasked with core regime interests – suggested that negotiations with those deemed “infidels” are possible, but only under the guiding principle of “resistance”: “It is even possible to negotiate with infidels”, he stated, “but based on what principle? It is possible to negotiate based on the principle of resistance.” Ahmadian thus echoed Khamenei’s late-January remarks when the latter had implicitly greenlighted negotiations, which ought to be conducted by Iranian officials in a manner upholding the Islamic Republic’s positions.

However, in a major turn, on February 7, in a speech before a large gathering of Iran Air Force and Air Defense Force commanders and staff, Khamenei said Tehran should not negotiate with the U.S. as this would be neither “wise”, “intelligent”, nor “honorable”. “Negotiations with the United States have no impact on solving the country’s problems. We must understand this correctly and not be misled into thinking that sitting at the negotiation table with that government will resolve certain issues. No, negotiations with the United States will not solve any problems,” Khamenei insisted. The Islamic Republic’s top religious, political and military leader explained his rejection of engaging in negotiations with the U.S. on grounds of “experience” of the past, namely of the JCPOA – which in his estimate saw Iranian concessions and compromises in exchange for Washington first violating the agreement by not lifting all U.S. sanctions and then withdrawing from it under Trump. 

Khamenei’s new position was taken up by other senior Iranian officials. For instance, the Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf stated: “Yesterday, the Supreme Leader made a clear and explicit statement on negotiations, which defines the consensus.” And he added: “My expectation and demand are that the president and his government colleagues align their actions with these directives and move forward accordingly.” In this vein, various voices within the establishment have called on President Masoud Pezeshkian either to refrain from engaging in diplomacy with Washington or even to step down, arguing that his declared mission to seek dialogue with the U.S. has no basis following Khamenei’s new directive.

Importantly, in a February 7 editorial, Javân,  a daily affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), wrote: “The Leader of the Revolution’s stance on negotiations with the United States was stated in the clearest possible terms, leaving no room for alternative interpretations.” The editorial also urged the Pezeshkian administration to urgently align with Khamenei’s directive “to safeguard national unity”. In this vein, on the same day, Foreign Minister Araghchi, on his part, announced that he will follow the Supreme Leader’s guidance in foreign policy.

Iranian considerations and fears

(1) Khamenei’s reinforced and continued support for Hezbollah and Hamas runs counter to Trump’s demands: On February 5, Khamenei appointed Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem as his representative in Lebanon. Later on February 8, Khamenei met with top Hamas officials (including the head of the Political Council of Hamas, Mohammed-Ismail Darwish) in Tehran at this critical juncture following Trump’s announcements on Iran policy, thereby underlining his rejectionist and confrontational stance towards the U.S. In fact, these two meetings sent this precise signal to both the U.S. and its chief regionally ally Israel. On this front, it cannot be ruled out that Hamas and Hezbollah will re-engage in destabilizing activities, either against Israel or against post-Assad Syria, as seen with the February 7 clashes on the Lebanese–Syrian border.

(2) Tehran fears a Trump diktat that would undermine the Islamic Republic’s sources of power: Ghalibaf said that the Trump administration had sent a written message to Iran calling for the full disarmament of the Islamic Republic. “The issue is not nuclear anymore. They speak of nuclear, missile, conventional and unconventional weapons; these are meant to disarm the Islamic Republic.” In fact, as “Trump II” has demonstrated so far, his approach is based on a “take it or leave it” approach, a quasi-diktat approach even seen in relation to U.S. allies. In other words, Trump’s readiness for a deal may not involve the lengthy negotiations the U.S. has engaged with Tehran under the Obama and Biden administrations, including several rounds of secret talks in countries like Oman.

(3) The Russia factor: It cannot be excluded that Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations with the U.S. is a result of Russian pressure, given the Kreml’s extraordinary influence on the Islamic Republic in general and Khamenei’s special devotion to Russia in particular. For Moscow, an Iranian–U.S. détente would be counterproductive to its power standing, both vis-à-vis Tehran and Washington. 

However, the issue of Iran–U.S. negotiations is not totally shelved. In fact, at this time, Khamenei’s rejection may reflect the regime’s concerns over the consequences of engaging in negotiations with Trump from a position of weakness. According to this logic, this would pave the way for Trump being able to “disarm” the regime by extracting concessions beyond the nuclear deal, namely leading to the further dismantling of Iran’s militia network and its conventional military and nuclear capabilities. 

Ghalibaf himself, for instance, acknowledged internal regime divisions on the issue of engaging in diplomacy with the Trump Administration, but he warned against framing the debate as a simple “yes or no” to negotiations.

However, time is running out for Tehran: (1) economic collapse may even be on the horizon: (a) On February 8, the day after Khamenei’s rejection of talks with Washington, the national currency, the rial, hit another record low of 891,000 per U.S. dollar. Compared to the same period last year, when the dollar stood at 510,000 rials, the Iranian currency has devalued by 75%. (b) Also, in this context, there is possibility that continued Iranian nuclear defiance will lead to the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism to be activated by the E3 (the UK, France and Germany), with the U.S. now openly pushing for this option. The resulting reimposition of comprehensive UN sanctions along with the return of “maximum pressure” sanctions may lead to economic collapse, resulting in a major destabilization of the Islamic Republic. 

Conclusion: the Islamic Republic between a Rock and a hard place

Given this backdrop, it could be that both Trump and Khamenei express maximalist positions – one exerting “maximum pressure” and the other rejecting any deal whatsoever.

Trump’s return to the White House has long solicited severe angst among the Islamic Republic’s establishment, as his “maximum pressure” sanctions had cost the latter $200 billion, according to Iranian officials. Now, given the ever-deepening economic crisis plaguing Iran, the restoration of “maximum pressure” could prove even more devastating, even threatening regime stability. Yet, Trump’s exclusion of former Iran hawks John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and Brian Hook along with his expressed desire now to seek a deal with Tehran are a silver lining for the Iranian regime. However, if one is to believe Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf’s statement that Trump’s message goes well beyond the nuclear issue and essentially calls for the Islamic Republic to disarm, Supreme Leader Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations with the Trump administration is a sign that the regime fears a Trump diktat that would amount to the regime’s capitulation. In other words, as in past instance, Tehran fears negotiating with the U.S. arch-enemy from a position of weakness. Today, more than ever, the Islamic Republic finds itself in a historical weakness, with the collapse of its regional “Axis of Resistance” – a key leverage along with its nuclear program. Therefore, it is unlikely that Tehran could use its regional power of nuisance (or “negative power”) to ameliorate its negotiating position with Washington, especially since Trump is well aware of the decline of Iranian regional power. 

As a result of all this, as reported by the Telegraph, several senior IRGC commanders – in other words, part of the IRGC’s oligarchy – fear that Khamenei “is pushing the regime towards collapse by blocking negotiations with the U.S.” Of course, Khamenei could in theory still reverse his rejection on grounds of a “heroic flexibility” as he did prior to the JCPOA when he thus greenlighted negotiations with Washington. Yet, given the arguments he used this time to completely dismiss diplomacy with the U.S., a U-turn would require heroic flexibility—both in rhetoric and rationalization—on his part. This would be even more daring in relation to the Islamic Republic’s declared “enemy no. 1,” Trump, the “assassin of Soleimani.” Tehran’s top general in the Middle East was killed in early January 2020 on Trump’s order, an event that has been central to half a decade of regime propaganda.

About the Author

Ali Fathollah-Nejad, PhD, is a German–Iranian political scientist and author focusing on Iran, the Middle East, and the post-unipolar world order. He is Director of the Center for Middle East and Global Order (CMEG), which publishes the weekly analytical briefing www.fokus-iran.com. 

Among his publications are, most recently, Iran – How the West is Betraying its Values and Interests [in German] (2025).