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Study
Russia's Supported Conflict in Myanmar – and Why It Matters for Europe

Russia is supporting Myanmar’s military junta with weapons, technology and political backing. A commissioned study reveals how closely the two regimes are intertwined – and why this partnership represents an overlooked gap in Europe’s sanctions policy.

 

On 18 August 2026, Min Aung Hlaing entered the Kremlin as the newly installed president of Myanmar. Moscow was the first place he had visited outside his immediate neighbourhood. Vladimir Putin described the relationship as 'especially trusting' (Bloomberg). 

A study by Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (CASSIS, University of Bonn) and Polina Lebedeva, commissioned by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, reveals the basis of this trust: Russia has provided Myanmar's military with aircraft, drones, training and intelligence, enabling them to continue fighting their own population. The conclusion for Europe is an uncomfortable one. A sanctions policy designed to starve Russia's war machine cannot afford to overlook Moscow's most loyal client in Southeast Asia.

Political Brotherhood

What binds Moscow and Naypyidaw today is less a shared past than a shared predicament. The study describes two 'militocracies' at war: Russia against Ukraine, and the junta against its own population. Both rely on their security apparatus, both are subject to Western sanctions, and both require allies. Their alliance is based on mutual support: Russia protects the junta at the UN Security Council, and the junta endorsed the invasion of Ukraine within days.

Summitry has turned the partnership into a personal bond. In August 2026, Min Aung Hlaing made his sixth official trip to Moscow since the coup, and his fourth meeting with Putin since the invasion of Ukraine. During their meeting at the Kremlin in March 2025, he hailed Putin as a 'king' (The Diplomat). Moscow returned the favour with gestures that mattered to a regime starved of recognition. For example, Sergei Shoigu, Russia's Security Council secretary, was the first foreign official to visit Myanmar after the so called “shame elections”. In February 2026, the two countries signed a five-year military cooperation pact.

The two regimes also support each other at the ballot box. For example, Myanmar sent observers to Russia's 2024 presidential election, with Min Aung Hlaing praising Putin's landslide victory as evidence of widespread public support. Since 2023, Russia's election commission has cooperated with its counterpart in Myanmar, and Russian observers monitored the polls that began in December 2025. Having swapped his uniform for a presidential title, Min Aung Hlaing returned to the Kremlin in August, declaring Myanmar to be "a reliable partner of Russia in Southeast Asia" (TASS).

Belarus completes the triangle. It was the only country to vote against the 2021 UN General Assembly call to stop the flow of arms to Myanmar, and it was in Minsk that Min Aung Hlaing announced his election timetable for March 2025. Russia abstained from the resolution while continuing to serve as one of the primary suppliers of weapons to Myanmar's military junta. In November of that year, Alexander Lukashenko became the first European head of state to visit Myanmar since the coup, returning again in July 2026. In August, Min Aung Hlaing flew straight from the Kremlin to Minsk. His host promised the Myanmar people 'everything they need today and tomorrow', and the guest invited Belarusian observers to the by-elections planned for 2027 (Anadolu). A cooperation roadmap for 2026–2028, export credits and, since October, high-interest loans for Belarusian goods provide a material basis for this alliance (The Irrawaddy).

The Military Lifeline

The military forms the core of the relationship. Russia has become the largest source of military assistance to the junta. According to the UN Special Rapporteur, entities in Russia shipped arms, raw materials and related supplies worth at least US$406 million to Myanmar's military in the first two years after the coup alone. Of the 28 Russian suppliers identified, 16 are subject to Western sanctions due to the war in Ukraine. Rosoboronexport, the state exporter, accounted for more than half of this, delivering Su-30 fighter jets, rocket launchers and parts for MiG-29s. In March 2025, Min Aung Hlaing thanked Putin in person for the delivery of six fighter jets (The Diplomat).

The impact is most visible in aircraft and drones. Since 2021, Russian-built jets and helicopters have been repeatedly used in airstrikes against insurgents and civilians. In 2025, Myanmar became the first foreign operator of Russia's new Mi-38 transport helicopter. The military junta has increased its imports of Russian Orlan-10E reconnaissance drones and, in November 2025, received Orlan-30 drones and RB-504A-E anti-drone systems via Rosoboronexport. Deployed in Kachin and northern Shan states, the jammers target the commercial drones on which the resistance relies. 

The authors of the study draw a sobering conclusion. The military's battlefield gains in 2024 and 2025 were based on conscription, Chinese pressure on armed groups in the north-east, and an increase in drone warfare, air raids, and artillery. Russian equipment, technical support and counterinsurgency advice "proved decisive" for the latter.

Training and intelligence programmes increase dependence. It is reported that more than 300 Myanmar officers train in Russia every year. During Min Aung Hlaing's visit in March 2025, Moscow announced the establishment of a joint satellite imagery analysis centre and offered to share reconnaissance data for military purposes. The two navies held joint exercises in 2023 and 2025, and in March 2026, three Russian navy vessels docked at Thilawa near Yangon.

Belarus is filling the gaps that Russia's own war has created. A joint commission on military-technical cooperation meets annually. Minsk has supplied air defence radars and command systems and has been implicated in the transfer of Russian Mi-24/35 helicopter gunships. The country also trains Myanmar military students in radio electronics, who then go on to work in the junta's weapons factories. Leaked correspondence even shows Belarus's state arms exporter offering to fly to Naypyidaw to collect payment in the form of cash or gold for unpaid bills.

The economic dimension

The economic relationship is smaller, but it is growing, and it is built to withstand sanctions. According to TASS, Putin stated that bilateral trade increased by around 40 per cent in 2024, reaching approximately US$2 billion. Furthermore, he revealed that Russia supplied over 90 per cent of the oil sold on Myanmar's market that year. For a regime short of dollars and fuel, this alone is a lifeline.

In June 2025, the two governments signed an investment pact covering offshore oil and gas fields, as well as the Dawei Special Economic Zone. As part of this agreement, Moscow has promised to build a deep-sea port, an oil refinery, and a coal-fired power plant (US-ASEAN Business Council). Rosatom is set to construct a small modular nuclear power plant with an output of around 100 megawatts. In August, Putin expanded the agreement to include exploration of Myanmar's continental shelf and the transit of Russian liquefied natural gas to third countries (Reuters).

The study calls for realism. Most long-term projects have not progressed beyond the declaration stage, and no Russian company had joined the Dawei consortium by the time the authors completed their research. However, Moscow does not require stability in Myanmar. While China's investments favour stability to some extent, the authors argue that Russia's inroads depend on exploiting instability through arms sales, energy deliveries, and a partner that shares its interest in circumventing sanctions.

The financial infrastructure is already in place. Since October 2023, a kyat–rouble payment system has enabled trade to take place independently of the US dollar. Myanmar's banks are connected to SPFS, Russia's alternative to SWIFT, and Russian Mir cards are accepted at outlets in Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw. At the centre of this sits Promsvyazbank, the Russian state bank under sanctions whose A7 payment platform claims to have processed over US$86 billion in less than a year. While the study finds no hard evidence that Russia uses Myanmar to launder money or evade financial sanctions, it warns that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The risk is compounded by Myanmar's scam compounds, a shadow banking system of their own.

The role of Europe

Why should Europe care about a war taking place more than 8,000 kilometres away? Because Myanmar is not just a recipient of Russian support. It plays three roles that directly affect European security.

It is a client state. The study describes an asymmetric relationship: a lifeline for the junta and a building block in Moscow's wider strategy of power projection in the Global South. Russia's influence hinges on the military staying in power. Therefore, every Russian arms sale is also an investment in the junta's survival.

It is a facilitator. Myanmar's banks are connected to Russia's alternative payment channels, and the country's transport minister has promoted its ports and railways as a transshipment hub for Russian exports. Western technology continues to appear in the supply chain. Prior to 2022, Albatross, a Russian drone manufacturer that delivered a test drone to Myanmar's air force in 2020, sourced propeller blades and carbon fibre from Germany. The study also reveals that a Singapore shell company marketed products from Set-1, a Russian drone electronics firm that has courted Myanmar's air force, and purchased microchips for Russia. Six of the seven private Myanmar firms that received Russian arms are under US, British or EU sanctions. The seventh is not.

It is an actor. In return for Russian weapons, Myanmar has supplied the Russian army with mines and returned tank sights that it had previously purchased. It is the only Southeast Asian country known to have supplied military equipment for Russia's war against Ukraine, albeit on a much smaller scale than North Korea or Iran. Min Aung Hlaing has pledged to maintain Myanmar's status as a reliable Russian partner in the region, and Naypyidaw has formally requested observer status in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.

This is a blind spot in Europe's sanctions policy. The EU's 20th sanctions package, introduced in April 2026, included entities in Thailand and a bank in Laos for assisting Russia in evading restrictions (Greenberg Traurig). By contrast, Myanmar is dealt with under a separate regime aimed at the junta, despite its arms, oil and payment ties to Moscow being closely linked to Russia's war economy.

Closing the Myanmar Gap

Heinemann-Grüder and Lebedeva begin with the premise that weakening the junta is integral to curbing Russia's access to resources for its war against Ukraine. They urge Germany and the EU to:

  • extend Russia sanctions to the Russia–Myanmar arms, oil and gas trade, including the shadow-fleet tankers that carry it;

  • sanction the Russian and Belarusian arms firms, brokers, vessels and banks involved, and coordinate cargo tracking and customs checks at transit hubs;

  • enforce dual-use controls rigorously, so that European components do not end up in drones over Myanmar;

  • pool intelligence on Russia–Myanmar transactions and support the documentation of war crimes;

  • work with Singapore, Thailand and India, whose companies the UN has linked to the junta's arms supply;

  • make future development cooperation and investment conditional on an end to Russian arms imports.

The timing matters. While Min Aung Hlaing tours the region in search of recognition, Washington has opened talks with Naypyidaw and lifted sanctions on several regime-linked businesspeople (Reuters). This makes Europe's consistency all the more important. None of the study's proposals require a new instrument. The EU already has sanctions regimes in place against Russia, Belarus and Myanmar; the latter was renewed in April until 2027. What is missing is the connection between them.

The aircraft, drones and payment channels that enable the junta to wage war belong to the same network that is sustaining Russia's war in Europe. Europe cannot close one part of this network while leaving another part open.

About the Study

Militocracies in Arms: Russia–Myanmar Relations, commissioned by the Hanns Seidel Foundation and completed in March 2026, is the work of Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (CASSIS, University of Bonn) and Polina Lebedeva. Drawing on expert interviews, open-source intelligence, and arms-trade data, the report maps the military, economic, and political ties between Moscow, Minsk, and Naypyidaw, setting out nine recommendations for German and European policy.

Download the full study here

Sources:

Bloomberg (via The Star), 19 August 2026: www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/08/19/putin-praises-especially-trusting-ties-with-myanmar-leader

AFP, 18 August 2026: citizen.digital/article/russias-putin-hosts-myanmars-leader-at-kremlin-n388542

The Diplomat, March 2025: thediplomat.com/2025/03/in-moscow-meeting-myanmar-junta-chief-praises-king-putin/

TASS, 18 August 2026: tass.com/world/2174697

DVB, 28 November 2025: english.dvb.no/belarus-president-lukashenko-makes-first-ever-visit-to-myanmar/

DVB, 3 July 2026: english.dvb.no/belarus-and-myanmar-strengthen-ties-during-president-lukashenkos-second-visit-since-2021-coup/

Anadolu Agency, 21 August 2026: www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/lukashenko-says-belarus-can-provide-myanmar-with-everything-they-need/4033686

The Irrawaddy, 16 October 2026: www.irrawaddy.com

TASS, 4 March 2025: tass.com/politics/1922515/amp

US-ASEAN Business Council, 10 July 2025: usasean.org/article/myanmar-seeks-eaeu-observer-status-amid-surge-russian-and-belarussian-economic-ties

Reuters, 18 August 2026: www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/08/18/russia-s-putin-hosts-myanmar-leader-talks-up-energy-projects

Greenberg Traurig, May 2026: www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2026/5/eus-20th-russia-sanctions-package-key-changes-and-compliance-implications

Reuters (via The Star), 12 October 2026: www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/10/12/us-lifts-sanctions-on-daughter-of-myanmar-military-linked-businessman

Brussels Times, 27 April 2026: www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/2100289/eu-extends-myanmar-sanctions-to-2027-citing-grave-rights-abuses

Contact

Resident Representative Thailand & Myanmar: Achim Munz
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Resident Representative Thailand & Myanmar
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