Interview with Dr. Wolfgang Stefinger, MP
German Delevopment Assistance in the Era of the Zeitenwende

Background

At a time characterized by an ever-intensifying network of global challenges, German and European development policy is facing increasing pressure and volatility. Today's world is witnessing complex geopolitical shifts, technological progress, ecological threats as well as the current Russian war of aggression on Ukraine and the conflict in the MENA region. These developments have raised the demands on development cooperation and international relations to an unprecedented level. In this interview with Dr. Wolfgang Stefinger, MP, an esteemed expert in development cooperation, notably serving as deputy spokesperson of the CDU/CSU-Group in the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development and the Chairman of the Development Policy Committee within the Foreign and Security Policy Working Group of the CSU, we will take an in-depth look at how German development policy is currently holding its own in the midst of this polycrisis - a multi-layered web of political, economic, social and ecological crises.

HSF: How does the "epochal shift (Zeitenwende)" in German and European development cooperation manifest itself? Are strategic shifts actually underway?

Stefinger: The term Zeitenwende is used with increasing inflationary frequency in Germany, so it is well worth taking a closer look. Basically, it is just a description of the fact that the view of international politics has changed. In reality, it is not the security situation or the network of relationships that has changed as a result of the Russian war of aggression, but rather the public perception of it. What is certainly true about this turning point is that foreign, security and development policy have once again become the focus of attention. Therefore, we must articulate more clearly and effectively why it is important and appropriate to support our partners not only morally but also economically and ecologically.- .

Our German Focus is generally directed on a few countries in the world: the USA, France, the EU and NATO, with Russia and China as a quasi-counterbalance. On the one hand, this is understandable, as Europe is on our doorstep and transatlantic relations are existential for us. However, the terrible events of October 7 and the war in Gaza show that this view of the world is not shared by everybody. Many countries in Africa feel emotionally attached to the Palestinians – perceiving this as a conflict between Israel and the USA (i.e. the powerful West) on the one hand, and the oppressed Palestinians on the other. Many in the so-called Global South feel more connected to the Palestinians. 76 percent of the world's population live in developing countries, which makes it politically convenient to build a narrative of the imperialist West against the oppressed Global South.

However, I believe that development policy has the chance to contribute here. Development policy is trying to draw attention to countries that otherwise tend to be below the radar. For example, it would be a wasted opportunity mention Africa only ever in connection with China. The African countries have a lot to offer and therefore rightly lay claim to relations based on a partnership approach. The fact that we have long and good development policy relations with some countries is already paying off here.

HSS: In your opinion, are there specific areas in which Germany could improve its strategies in order to respond more effectively to these challenges?

Stefinger: We clearly recognize that Russia and China in particular, but also Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other states, have massively expanded their influence in Africa. With propaganda and fake news, but also by providing what we could not or did not want to provide: Security, infrastructure, and investment. Although some of the Chinese investments turned out to be debt traps and some of the infrastructure was pointless, we must critically reassess our offerings, which are often overly bureaucratic, burdened with excessive conditions, and, most importantly, lacking adequate investment Compared to our proposals, Chinese and Indian offers are easier and quicker to implement.

Which leads me directly to the role of the BRICS or now BRICS+. The BRICS are not comparable with other developing countries. Criticism of development policy is often tempting because it must navigate an incredibly delicate balancing act. For example: We pursue development cooperation with South Africa, India and Brazil on the one hand and with the countries of the Sahel on the other. The circumstances could hardly be more different. It should be obvious that cooperation with India, for example (itself one of the largest investors on the African continent), must be very different from that with traditional developing countries. I think we need to find new answers here. Perhaps we also need to reform the DAC list classification and ODA payments.

HSS: How do you evaluate the growing division in development cooperation?  Would you say that dynamics between donor and recipient countries are changing due to new players, e.g. China, but also other BRICS countries? And focusing on the African Continent, we see that Russia is also increasingly acting as a donor in development cooperation, but also as a military partner. What challenges do you perceive for the "value-based" Western development cooperation and is Germany still attractive as a values-based donor?

Stefinger: Ignoring the rise of the BRICS would be exactly the mistake I just pointed out. In large parts, the world is on a different frequency than we imagine. We can see this very clearly in the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as in the Russian war against Ukraine. At the United Nations, the global South does not vote the way we would like it to. It is even more apparent when you look at South Africa's case against Israel at the International Criminal Court. The Global South is on the side of Palestine. The reasons may be complex, but it is clear that South Africa is speaking for the Global South here. Modi tried and succeeded in doing the same in India during the G20 presidency.

The expansion of the BRICS to include the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Argentina, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia is at first glance a clear economic sign: 36% of the world's gross national income (more than the G7, which is around 31%) and 46% of the world's population (G7: around 10%). More than 40% of global oil production and more than 36% of global gas production can be attributed to the BRICS countries.

With this in mind, BRICS can be understood as a targeted counterweight to the G7 and therefore as an anti-Western alliance. In other words, an attempt to change the global order. I think we should not downplay this, but neither should we overestimate it. Of course, these countries are trying to gain greater influence, find an alternative to the US dollar and force a greater say. In doing so, they are forcing us – the Global North – to make new and better offers. It remains to be seen whether the EU's Global Gateway initiative is a suitable response to these challenges. The political and social conditions in the eleven member states are very diverse, relations between the countries are sometimes characterized by foreign policy tensions and even tangible rivalries, and there can be no talk of a common "superstructure of values" – unless principles such as "non-interference in internal affairs" or economic pragmatism are regarded as a "unifying ideology". There have been many alliances in history that have ultimately failed due to their heterogeneity or at least have never been able to formulate and assert their own positions. The Non-Aligned Movement is just one example.

However, it is important that we do not engage in a zero-sum game, but rather maintain our position or take the lead. These countries can most certainly do one thing: reduce our influence in a zero-sum game and, above all, make offers to autocratic rulers that do not help the people but only the regime. We must not become a driven party who is only able to react. In the Sahel, we have only played a spectator role as Russia has spread its power without being able to make any offers ourselves.

This is why I am convinced that we need to supplement our traditional development policy instruments for the African continent with those of foreign trade. The current administration, at least, is tending to return to traditional development aid. That is a big mistake. The United Nations assume that we have an annual gap of 4.5 trillion US dollars between the funds made available and those that would be needed to achieve the SDGs by 2030. It is obviously a truism to realize that this amount can never be raised by governments with taxpayers' money alone. We urgently need private capital.

The Compact with Africa, which was established by Chancellor Merkel and Development Minister Müller aimed to do just that. Helping people to help themselves. Loans were intended to leverage private capital, enabling the economy to create jobs in Africa and people should have seen perspectives for themselves. Instead, the current German government is making disproportionately large cuts of almost 20% in the field of private sector cooperation. And the remaining funds are now mainly being used for trade union work – which is also important but not creating jobs in the first place. This is clearly a wrong priority! We must promote a social market economy in order to create prosperity and peace and not make cuts in this particular area.

On my trips to Africa, this is exactly what I experience time and time again. Above all, the people I talk to tell me that they want jobs above all else. In this regard, Germany still has a good reputation. German companies are perceived as good employers who pay fairly and provide people with training.

The social market economy – as we established it after the Second World War – was a gift for German democracy. We should do all we can to export precisely this model. This is not perceived as neo-colonialist by our partner countries, as is sometimes the case with the current government’s feminist policies. Rather, it directly benefits the people, enables them to build a life and prospects for themselves and are not be dependent on the charity of despotic regimes. Germany continues to be a sought-after partner. But other nations are clearly demonstrating that we are not the only ones. We therefore need to do much better. We are overly bureaucratic. Projects are often overloaded. Of course it is important and correct to maintain high standards, but if this ultimately leads to German businesses no longer being able to compete with for example Chinese companies, then I doubt that this will help anyone.

HSS: Do you think that in the future development cooperation will be guided increasingly by foreign policy interests? How can this be reconciled with the criticism of China’s assumed interest-based development cooperation, which has been voiced for almost 20 years now, especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa? Would you say that allegations of Western double standards are at least partially justified?

Stefinger: In light of the statement that development cooperation is often seen as an extension of security policy and national interests, how can humanitarian objectives and geopolitical interests in German development policy be balanced? And how does this perception influence the long-term effectiveness and credibility of German development initiatives?

Bismarck is credited with saying: “States have no friends, states have interests.” I believe that this truth has been unwelcome in recent years. We have to express our interests if we want to realize goals. But I also believe, and in this respect Bismarck’s phrase is no longer correct, that development policy in particular is an important instrument and not a zero-sum game.

The accusation of double standards is a serious one. But is there any truth to it? Germany is the second largest development donor after the USA, even ranking ahead of the EU. Therefore, from a purely financial point of view, we are doing quite a lot. This, by the way, is a point we need to communicate much better. Who knows that we are the second largest donor after the USA for non-military aid in Ukraine or Palestine? My point is not that the German flag has to be on every aid convoy. But I do believe that it is in the German, European and Western interest for people to know where the aid is coming from. Some authoritarian states are much better at marketing much smaller amounts of aid.

Another issue is that double standards are sometimes confused with ambiguity. We have to learn to deal with this inconsistency in today’s digitally networked and interdependent world. Not every decision in a democracy will be stringent; there are too many different global interests and dependencies that cannot always be reconciled. However, it is important that the government deals with this transparently and that we as politicians explain this to citizens with equal transparency.

That being said, there are areas where the accusation of double standards is valid. Not all tariffs that we levy today are still justified. Not all trade agreements are fair by today’s standards. Some of them urgently need to be put to the test. But it is also part of the political truth of a democracy that not everything is centrally orchestrated. That is why we and all other democratic parties in the Bundestag conduct internal debates between different political specialists, as well as between the different parties in parliament.

Value-based politics, on the other hand, has become a fighting term that is hardly appropriate anymore, if only because the question is what values we are actually talking about. If we only have relations with countries that share our values, then there won’t be many left. I think we would be better off talking about attitude instead. By attitude, I mean that we insist on respect for human rights and freedoms whenever possible and promote democracy. At the same time, however, we can and must also clearly state our interests. That would lead to a more honest discussion.

HSS: Let’s move on to a topic that concerns the interests of the German economy. What measures could Germany introduce to mitigate geopolitical dependencies, for example on energy, raw materials or production sites?

Stefinger: Last year I travelled to Chile and Argentina, and previously to Colombia. These countries have great potential. They are very close to us culturally and largely share our values. Therefore, when we talk about reducing our dependencies, we should definitely think more of Latin America.

The tri-border region of Bolivia, Chile and Argentina contains an estimated 70 percent of the world’s lithium deposits. Other raw materials such as copper and silver are also abundantly available there.

Chile has set the target of producing and exporting the world’s most competitive hydrogen from renewable energies by 2030. Colombia, as well as other Latin American countries, have similarly favourable prerequisites. This should give us hope for the future. After all, a study by the World Energy Council assumes that we will have a global annual hydrogen demand of up to 9,000 terawatt hours by 2050, which corresponds to 270 million tons of hydrogen. This would roughly match the amount of energy that is currently generated from all renewable energy sources combined.

Of course, we must not forget Brazil and its Amazon region in this list. The green lung of the world. We will only solve global problems globally. This is precisely why, in the grand scheme of things, it doesn’t matter whether we save a ton of CO2 in Germany or in Brazil. One hectare of tropical forest sequesters an average of 734 tons of CO2 as carbon. The Federal Environment Agency puts the price of one ton of CO2 at a very conservative estimate of 237 euros. This means that I can save almost 174,000 euros on an area of 1.5 soccer pitches (about 1 hectare) of rainforest.

This highlights one thing very clearly: the world is highly interconnected. What Putin does in Europe has an impact on the whole world. We have to show our partners a corresponding level of commitment. Many Latin American democracies are constantly under attack from the extreme left and right. We must act as a reliable partner here, even in turbulent times. The Mercosur agreement would be a huge opportunity for economic development and prosperity. The French attitude in this regard is irresponsible. Chancellor Scholz, on the other hand, does not seem to think it necessary to find the right arguments to pressure on Paris.

HSS: Which strategic parameters should now be established for international cooperation in the 21st century, considering the prevailing global political and economic conditions?

Stefinger: We urgently need to focus on three issues:

Firstly, we need a Ministry for International Relations. A strict silo mentality is no longer appropriate for ministries. Looking at the number the Federal Government’s Africa strategies, you will know what I am talking about: five ministries each have their own "Africa strategy". These should be coordinated and led by one department. The variety of funding pools and applications is even more confusing when a company wants to get involved in Africa. This is no way to motivate SMEs, the backbone of the German economy, to enter the African market.

The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) is completely oversized. If you can no longer read the organization chart properly even when printed out on A3, then you don't need to see an optometrist, but the organization is simply too big. No minister can effectively manage such a multitude of areas. We currently have a climate minister who has secured a large part of the budget for foreign climate policy. But we don't have a Minister for Economic Affairs and certainly no one who is passionate about foreign trade. This cannot continue!

We need a ministry that bundles and coordinates economic, environmental and development policy cooperation with developing countries - let’s call them opportunity countries – and that also has the corresponding competencies. “One telephone number for all issues for and with developing countries”.

This leads to the second point: we need a service mentality and have to start thinking from the user's perspective. The idea of service-orientation must find its way into the federal ministries. Incidentally, this has a lot to do with administrative digitization. The administration must become more efficient. Companies need a point of contact to help them enter the African market.

Our foreign representations must also be staffed accordingly. If the focus in a developing country is on economic development, then there must also be the appropriate expertise in the embassy. The ambassador's post does not always have to be filled by the Federal Foreign Office. Rather, the foreign mission must focus on ensuring that German companies find support in the country quickly and non-bureaucratically. It is unacceptable to burden companies with more and more bureaucracy and discourage them from investing in the African market.

Finally, we need the courage to embrace geo-economics. This includes rethinking the toolbox of foreign guarantees. Currency risks are just as often an obstacle for companies. Purchase guarantees are needed particularly in the energy sector. All of these are investments. The German taxpayer should not be blindly liable for entrepreneurial risks abroad as is the case with Chinese state-owned companies. Instead, the funds already available should be used in a more targeted manner for economic development instead of a shotgun approach.

This also means reducing the number of countries we are cooperating with and taking security policy aspects into account. Geo-economics certainly means putting a price tag on some economic expansions. It can be much more cost-effective to support a country’s economic development than to end up with expensive dependencies on Chinese companies, for example. Energy, migration and security must become central pillars of cooperation.